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This thesis examines the problems affecting the
quantitative assessment of technical risk in Department of
Defense major weapon systems acquisition. A Decision Theory
approach is used. Commercial techniques and current DoD
methods of technical risk assessment are investigated.
TASCFORMTt-1 technology values are used in a linear regression
model to characterize the growth of technology over time.
The model residuals provide a probability distribution for
estimating the likelihood of achieving a specified level of
technical performance. The benefit of a utility function
for describing technical risk perceptions is considered.
The Expanded Pearson-Tukey method of describing risk is also
investigated. Continued research into technology valuation
techniques is recorronended. A test case application of the
Expanded Pearson-Tukey method is also recommended~ to
determine its ability to provide reliable and timely
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Soviet military retrenchment and political collapse have
significantly affected U.S. strategic and tactical force
structure and requirements. United States national defense
goals and requirements presently lack the refinement and
broad consensus forty years of Soviet confrontation
engendered. The Federal bUdget deficit is viewed as a
severe threat to the health and future of the nation 1 s
economy and the Department of Defense (DoD) budget will
remain under severe pressure throughout the 1990s. Not only
will there be less money to support existing programs and
initiatives, but the Department IS ability to introduce new
systems will be increasingly constrained.
The systems purchased to support the changes in military
doctrine that an altered international landscape requires
must have greater f1 exibi 1 i ty, re 1iabi 1 i ty and
interoperability. Simultaneously, these systems must be
brought on-line without the schedule and cost over-runs that
plagued DoD during the years of sustained Soviet threat.
Acquisition programs that experience perturbations in terms
of schedule .. cost .. or performance will not only fail to
mature but will cause damaging ripple effects to other
programs because of the smaller total force structure.
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For the last forty years the United States has relied
upon an acquisition strategy of fielding technologically
superior systems to counter-balance the numerical advantages
of a perceived Soviet threat. Technical sophistication has
permeated all levels of force structure and doctrine,
requiring state-of-the-art performance from individual
hardware components. Increasingly complex data acquisition,
processing, and exchange networks are required to support
the command and control requirements of forces equipped with
these systems.
Despite continuous efforts, the United States has been
unable to consistently develop, field, and maintain a force
structure that possesses an effective technological
advantage over Warsaw Pact/Soviet forces [Ref. 1]. This has
forced the U.S. defense establishment to continually
attempt the development and fielding of ever more advanced
capabilities subject to increasingly rigid cost and time
constrajnts. Aggressive performance and schedule goals
sometimes have been specified without a consistent or
coherent assessment of the risks.
While much criticism has been leveled at DoD because of
past cost and schedUle over runs and performance failures
[Ref. 2:pp. xxiii-xxv], there was often sufficient breadth
in new capability development efforts and elasticity in
bUdgets to ameliorate the effects of performance
short-falls, cost, and schedule over-runs in anyone
2
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particular program. The Navy was able to field improvements
to Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) capabilities with three systems
through the 1970s and 1980s. The AEGIS ship-board radar and
missile system# F-14 Tomcat/PHOENIX missile system, and the
F/A-18 Hornet, were eventually fielded despite cost#
schedule# and performance problems with all three. In the
future, programs which experience these problems could have
a devastating impa~t on force structures and capabilities.
The Navy's A-12 Avenger program, employing"stealth"
technology, was designed as a replacement for the venerable
A--6 Intruder medium attack aircraft. The A-12 enjoyed the
highest priority within the service. An A-6 Upgrade program
(A-6F) was cancelled so that resources available for the A-
12 program would not be constrained. Cancellation of the A-
12 program not only resulted in the significant delay of a
vitally needed capability# but has seriously weakened the
Navy's ability to fund other important aviation programs in
a climate of fiscal austerity. Financial resources to meet
heavy lift# maritime patrol, AAW, and carrier-based early
warning programs are all jeopardized [Refs. 3,4].
The current acquisition environment is characterized by
concurrent development of systems that will operate with a
wide variety of forces in numerous environments. Single-
service programs tailored to meet unique service objectives
will receive far greater scrutiny and will become rarities.
The impact of a termination could have severe effects on the
3
capabilities of the entire DoD force structure in this sort
of environment. Termination of the A-12 has stopped Air
Force efforts to develop a derivative A-12 as a replacement
for theF-15 Eagle and F-l11 [Ref. 3J.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to examine existing
acquisition program risk assessment theories and methods#
evaluate their efficacy as employed in commercial settings#
and look for ways that successful commercial approaches
could be adapted for use within the unique DoD acquisition
decision environment. Specifically# this research attempts
to create a useful and flexible definition of technological
risk and to identify risk assessment methods that are
accessible to DoD program managers and their staffs.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Commencing with the axiomatic framework constructed by
von Neumann and Morgenstern [Ref. 5]# a large body of work
has addressed risk assessment for individual or corporate
decisions. Transference of these theories and techniques to
the DoD acquisition setting requires investigation.
Assumptions about the nature and availability of
alternatives for subsequent "risk premium ll and certainty
equivalent analysis may not directly apply to the DoD
environment. This thesis will examine the following aspects
of risk assessment from a Decision Theory perspective:
4
1. What are the underlying theories and methodology
supporting risk assessment in decision analysis?
2. How are these methods applied in commercial
settings? What are their strengths and weaknesses?
3. What are the major factors defining the 000
technical risk assessment environment? Are these factors
similar to those found in the commercial world?
4. Evaluate whether or not the techniques used by
commercial acqUisition program managers can be applied
directly to the DoD acquisition case. If not, what changes
would be required.
5. Suggest possible improvements to existing 000
technical risk acquisition methods.
This thesis will not examine cost and/or schedule issues
nor the procedures for determining the performance
requirements specified for new systems.
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
1. Scope
There are two basic approaches used to define risk
assessment: normative or prescriptive, and descriptive. The
normative approach strives to define ways in which a
Ilrational" person should go about confronting the Universe.
The descriptive approach primarily seeks to understand how
real people make real decisions.
5
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There exists a resultant tension between these two
approaches that must be monitored if usable decision tools
are to be fashioned. However. for the purposes of this
thesis, the emphasis will be on how a normative approach can
be applied to the risk assessment problem of the program
manager or acquisition executive.
2. Limitations
Within the normative scheme there are three
decision--making approaches, all using some form of IIdivide
and conquer":
1. Cost Benefit Theory (CBT)
2. Social Welfare Theory (SWT)
3. Decision Theory (DT)
All three use a standard partitioning of the decision-making
problem, seeking to counter-pose knowledge and values at
each step of the process and synthesize these in a logically
consistent manner [Ref. 6].
The CBT approach is basically an impersonal one,
based upon "scientific objectivity." SWT tends to focus on
the organizational dynamics and social processes. Decision
Theory frames the problem within the context of the
individual as the decision-making entity.
While subjective in its world view .. Decision Theory
seems suitable for helping individual acquisition decision
makers confronted with the problem of technical risk
6
,assessment. This is particularly beneficial, since a body
of obJe.ctive, verifiable data is not always available at the
early stages of new acquisition projects [Ref. 7].
E. LITERATURE REVIEW
One particular aspect of the DoD acquisition conundrum
is the assessment of technical risk. A 1986 GAO Report,
commissioneg by the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, found numerous inconsistencies and omissions in how
acquisition program ~ffices tackled the problem of technical
risk assessment. The report examined twenty-five major
acquisition programs whose development and production costs
exceeded $180 billion:
DOD has identified many technical risk approaches, both
quantitative and qualitative. But there is insufficient
policy and training to guide program managers in the
selection of suitable approaches. Further, no standard
definition of technical risk exists within DOD.
Accordingly, many program offices have developed their
own informal definitions of technical risk and risk-
rating categories, but GAO found them inconsistent and
sometimes contradictory. Despite DOD's 1981 initiative,
none of the 25 program offices had conducted a
quantitative technical risk assessment to support
budgeting for risk. {Ref. 8:p. 3J
To date, the problems enumerated by the GAO in 1986
remain largely unaddressed. While a large number of
logically consistent decision tools have been developed in
academic environments, accessibility and implementation
by DoD acquisition authorities and their staffs remain
inconsistent or even nonexistent.
7
Despite the daunting challenges involved in developing
such a revolutionary stealth capability, the Navy
characterized the A-12 program as possessing "low" risk.
The Navy designated the T-45 program, a jet training
aircraft to replace both the T-2 Buckeye and TA-4 Skyhawk
training aircraft, also as "low" risk [Ref. 9].
The T-45 was originally a land-based British de~ign that
had to be altered for compatibility with the carrier
environment. The "low-risk ll designation was assigned,
despite the fact that no land-based aircraft design had been
su.ccessfully reengineered for carrier duty since 1945. The
program suffered serious performance problems, schedule
slippages, and cost overruns [Ref. 9J.
The problem of aircraft acquisition technical risk
assessment is not confined to aerodynamic issues. The
Navy's Enhanced Modular Signal Processor (EMSP), designed to
handle a wide range of acoustic and electronic processing
requirements through the end of the twentieth century, has
had by many problems despite its designation as a II low'! risk
program [Ref. 10]. The Air Force' C-17 program has been
beset by performance and cost problems as well as schedule
delays arising from the adoption of an ostensibly "low risk"
approach to the software design for flight control computers
[Ref. 11].
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Despite numerous DoD and service-issued directives aimed
at assessing, quanti tying and controll ing risk .. e.g .. , DoD
Instruction 5000.2, there are no 000 mandated methodologies
for meeting these directives [Refs. 12 .. 13 .. 14]. The
Defense Systems Management College (DSMe) has issued a
publication that covers most of the standard methods for
risk identification and assessment [Ref. 15]. However ..
there has been no adoption of either the DSMC's scale for
low, medium, or high probability of occurrence .. nor any
policy guidance concerning what should constitute low,
medium, or high risk for acquisition activities.
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Chapter III will lC!>okat how technical risk assessment
issues are addressed in commercial operations. Chapter IV
will define the DoD technical risk assessment and decision
environment, a necessity for framing any recommendations for
potential risk assessment approaches. Chapter V will
attempt to provide some recommended methods for technical
risk assessment. Chapter VI will contain concluding





II. BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. THE DECISION PROBLEM
Decision making is a unique human activity. Only humans
seem to possess the faculty of recognizing the possibility
or availability of more than one alternative or course of
action in a set of circumstances over some period of time.
Decision making arises from the application of some value
system imposed upon a particular environment. It assumes
that a selected objective or goal can be obtained through
the purposeful expenditure of resources in hand~ fl ••• in
the light of norms or general principles, or of future
outcomes.1/ [Ref. 16:p. 131]
As Bunn points out, the activity of decision making is
available t.o individuals~ organizations and society.
Decision making is a characteristic of "purposeful" systems:
the nature and gravity of decision making activities are
tied to the attainment of objects or goals that in some
fashion support or further the lIgood" of the entity
formulating the decision [Ref. 17]. Simon's definition of
the three phases of decision making applies to the DoD
acquisition environment: Finding occasions for making
decisions; finding possible courses of action; and choosing
among courses of action. II [Ref. 18].
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The purpose of decision analysis is to provide a
logically consistent and flexible framework for helping the
decision maker generate and evaluate the various
alternatives that may present themselves. The flaws
inherent in innate and intuitive decision making processes
have been the subject of extensive research. Numerous
researchers have commented upon and measured the relatively
limited human data processing capabilities [Ref. 19].
Decislon types fall into three categories. There are
automatic or intuitive decisions that take place in such a
manner that the individual is often unaware of the process.
Decision making in an athletic competition is an example of
this sort of decision making. Pondering the proper course
of action during an athletic event almost invariably seems
to impair p~rformance.
Some decisions may be very complex but exhibit
characteristics that make their resolution tractable to
strict rules or instructions. On a mechanical level~ the
operation of a thermostat or a fuel control unit falls into
this category. The operator may not know instinctively what
action to take. However, a satisfactory result can be
obtained from the careful and sequential following of a set
of instructions, achieving a desired temperature or power
setting without weighing options or detailed process
knowledge.
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Lastly_ there are those decisions that require careful
and measured consideration. These are often characterized
by a bewildering array of possible alternatives. Obtaining
the knowledge necessary to determine the suitability and
cost of achieving a particular course of action may be
extraordinarily difficult. Howard states, IIdecision making
is what. you do when you do not know what to do." [Ref. 20].
1. Elements of the Decision Problem
Following Bunn[Ref. 17J, four major factors
characterize the problem and affect the subsequent
formulat.ion of any solution: Uncertainty, Multiple
Objectives, Multiple Opt.ions, and Sequentiality.
a. Uncertainty
Uncertainty is the key obstacle to the
resolution of most important decisions and affects the other
t.hree factors. Many times the decision maker can envision
multiple possible outcomes and can place some sort of odds
of occurrence on particular events. Some of the outcomes
will be counter to the goals pursued and might be ruinous to
the individual or organization making the decision.
Decision makers simply cannot know, a priori, how events




Organizational or individual goals may be
complex when carefully considered. The objective may have
multiple attributes. A computer system could be
characterized by the length of words it can handle~
processing time~ or memory size. The goal may be subject to
some resource constraint or other conflicting requirement.
The problems associated with nuclear power plant design and
siting [Ref. 21] are classic examples of this dilemma. How
should the decision maker evaluate independent and possibly
conflicting goals and attributes?
c. Multiple Options
The alternatives that are generated as
candidates for meeting a goal may not completely satisfy all
requirements. Some combination of alternatives may be
required to reach the objective. How should the decision
maker eliminate inadequate options without unnecessarily
reducing the resolution of any screening device? How can he
ensure that he has not overlooked an efficient possibility?
d. Sequentiality
Problems often present themselves over a period
of time: the entire issue is not resolvable at any
particular instant but requires continual iteration as new
data become available. The decision maker may be confronted
with numerous paths whose existence and efficiency are
contingent upon previous actions. Sequentiality may be
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deliberately imposed upon the problem by the organization.
In his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis .. Allison
[Ref.22J discusses senior decision makers· penchants for
delaying the implementation of decisions that may be
irreversible or delaying action because of fear that the set
of possible options may be reduced.
2. Decision Analysis ReqUirements
The purpose of decision analysis is to directly
address issues in a manner that helps the decision maker
more completely define his problem and evaluate his possible
courses of action. The analyst must remember that someone
else will make the decision and will carry the onus of the
results if events turn out poorly. But what are the
requirement.s for a good decision analysis? First, the
analysis must capture the essential elements of the problem
in a fashion that the decision maker can grasp. This
presupposes an interative format, relying upon the intuition
and judgement of those charged with arriving at a decision.
The investigation must be couched in such a manner that it
leads to a complete understanding of the issue at hand, or
at. least as complete as is possible .. given the ever-present
constraints of time and money [Ref. 23].
Second, the rule of coherence must be followed. If
the decision maker seeks to behave in a rational manner .. his
actions must be logically consistent and free from hidden
contradictions. Rationality as a necessary condition in
15
this sense implies that the individual or other decision
making entity must seek to maintain or improve his wealth.
Failure to act in a coherent fashion leads to the "perpetual
money-making machine" paradox.
Suppose an individual considered event A as less
likely than event B and event B as less likely than event C.
Suppose further that rather than concluding that A is less
likely than C, this individual decides that C is less likely
than A. Assume that event A provides an outcome that is
valuable to this individual~ a prize of some sort, while B
and C do not. In this case, the person would be willing to
pay some amount of money to replace A with B. If the prize
is now contingent on B .. the individual could be induced to
pay some fee to replace B with C. A third sum of money
could be obtained by offering to replace C with A~ an event
he considers less likely. The individual is now at the
starting point with the exception that he is demonstrably
poorAr. As long as the individual holds to his order of
ranking~ money can be made ad infinitum~ or at least until
he is drained of cash. Such behavior is defined as
incoherent [Ref. 17].
B. DECISION CRITERIA
Decision criteria can be separated into two main
categories~ nonstochastic and stochastic. The nonstochastic
approach ignores the existence of probability and seeks to
16
use a restrictive concept of dominance to generate the best
solution. Stochastic techniques explicitly apply notions of
probability to the process of determining a best solution.
There are problems associated with the application of both
these approaches.
1. Nonstochastic Methods
Nonstochastic methods seek to discover the best
alternative for satisfying the decision maker's goals
through the discovery of a course of action that will be
superior' to all others, no matter the outcome of events.
Dominance approaches can be defined as strict dominance,
maximin, maximax, and regret strategies.
4. Outcome Dominance
Consider a matrix that lists possible results
for three different alternatives in the event of three
different outcomes and assume that the decision maker
prefers more to l~ss:
ALTERNATIVES
:A:I. A2 A-::J:
E 1 :2 1 3
POSSIBLE E2 :6 5 4 (1 )
OUTCOMES
E::s :9 7 8
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An inspection shows that for any possible event~
E1 "E~~ or E:.~~ alternative A1 dominates A2 • As summarized
by Bunn~ any alternative Aqdominates Ap " if for every E i
y~q is greater than or equal to YiP and y~q is greater than
Yip for at least one Ei [Ref. 17:p. 17]. No assumptions
about the relative likelihood of event occurrence have been
made. While this technique is simple to use~ it is only.
applicable to a very small set of fortunate circumstances.
Additionally~ the best this technique can be expected to
provide is some reduction in the number of possibly
satisfactory alternatives. As can be seen from (1) above~
while alternative A~:~ can be removed from consideration~
deciding bet.ween A:L and A::$ remains a problem.
b. Maximin
The maximin approach takes a pessimistic or
conservative approach to the problem to the sorting of best
alternatives. Consider (1) again. The maximin approach is
to search each column and identify the smallest outcome
value a particular event could generate. For this example~





E1 :2* 1* 3*
POSSIBLE E~:2 :6 5 4 (2)
.
OUTCOMES
. E.'3 :9 7 8
The maximin solution problem is to choose the alternative
that provides the largest of the possible minimum, in this
case A3. Maximin attempts to make the best of a bad
situation.
The efficacy of this approach diminishes rapidly
in cases where there are very large differences in possible





-_:-A;J, ~_ _ ~__k
E:l : 31 32
E;.~ : 10 , 000 33
(3)
Here the maximin strategy would recommend A2 based upon a
strict observance of the decision rule. The decision maker
following this recommendation, assuming again that the
object is maximize monetary returns .. would end up IIpenny-
wise and pound-fool ish. II
19
c. Maximax
This strategy is the obverse of maximin~ viewing
the occurrence of random events in the most optimistic
manner. The decision maker is required to identify the
maximum payoff for each possible course of action and then
select the alternative that provides the greatest return.
TlliB is clearly untenable in the event that an alternative





OUTCOMES El : 31 32 (4)
E:;;~ : -10~OOO 33
Maximax would recommend alternative A2~ oblivious to the
potential for substantial monetary loss.
d. Regret
The regret strategy uses an approach
similar t.o maximin. The selection criterion focuses upon
how the decision might be viewed from the vantage of












A mini-max regret analysis would consider what the best
alternative would be for each possible outcome. Clearly
if E~ occurs, the best strategy is select A2. Likewise, A1
is best, i f E::;~ takes place. The analysis continues by













Ft"om this step .. the al ternative that provides the minimum
non-zero opportunity loss is selected.
This approach has certain emotional appeal,
particularly in situations where hindsight evaluations can
severely affect the decision maker. It may be the most
regularly appl ied, at- least subconsciously, of all decision
analysis tools. A serious flaw affects this strategy. It
can be shown that a decision maker employing the minimax
21
regret approach could be turned into a perpetual money-
making machine [Ref. 24], violating the coherence principle.
Additionally, the technique is subject to the problem of
rank reversal, which negates its effectiveness in tackling
problems that unfold in a sequential fashion.
2. Stochastic Methods
The coherence principle implies that the decision
maker will use all of the information at his disposal. If
some opinion of the relative likelihood of various events is
available, it should be explicitly brought into the
analysis. Information about likelihood could arise from a
body of quantified statistical data, e.g., survey sample or
previous experience, from which a probability distribution
could be constructed or might reside in the field of
judgement and professional intuition. When dealing with the
allocation of scarce resources to obtain some best possible
return, it would be foolish not to incorporate as much
relevant information into the decision making process as
possible. Three common methods, Modal, Expected Value .. and
Expected Regret attack the decision problem in a
probabilistic manner. All are measures of central tendency,
and as such, tend to ignore or reduce the impact of outliers




As the name implies, modal analysis seeks to
identify the most likely occurrence, based upon some set of
probabilities the decision maker has provided. Consider the
following example of alternatives and potential outcomes
subject to the assigned probabilities.
ALTERNATIVES
E I P (E;.) I 1\1 1\2 A3I ,
POSSIBLE I I
.,----'-,._--,-,_.,
OUTCOMES E:l : 0.2 10 8 15
E2: 0.5 6 9 3 (7)
E:;,;: 0.3 18 5 1
Note that the probabilities sum to one. It can be easily
seen, that under the modal scheme, E2 is most likely, hence
A2 should be the chosen course of action. Problems with
this method arise when the resolution between probability
values decreases and the potential payoff matrix possesses





E I P(E:l.) I A:I. A::;~ A3I I
POSSIBLE I I..,_I,__.__..__---.!...
OUTCOMES E1 : 0.21 1 98 90
E2: 0.23 0 85 83 (8)
E~~ : 0.56 18 15 15
The moda I approach waul d yi e 1dE:::!; as the pre f erred
alternative, without investigating the possible effects of
the large difference in payoff values. An argument has been
made that modal analysis is subject to the same perpetual
money-making critiriism that afflicted the minimax regret
method [Ref. 24]. Modal analysis can also be affected by
the way data are aggregated. Consider the following example
taken from Devore [Ref. 25:p. 11]. The length of service ..
in years .. for 94 Supreme Court Justices who had terminated
their services were tallied. If the length of service is
















With this aggregation, the mode is 6 - 15 years of service.





















The mode in (10) is now 3 - 7 years of service. This
illustrates that the abilities of the data to explain a
process are sensitive to the metrics imposed by the decision
maker.
b. Expected Value
Expected value calculates the average or mean
payoff value and then chooses the alternative that provides
the highest mean return. Each possible alternative payoff
is multiplied by its associated probability and the results
are summed for each alternative. Matrix (11) provides an
example of how probability is incorporated into the payoff
matrix to determine the best alternative.
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ALTERNATIVES
E I P(E:!.) , Aj. Az A3I ,
POSSIBLE I I
--'"-' -----'_._.._.OUTCOMES E1 : 0.2 10 8 15
.~~
E:""2 : 0.5 6 9 3 (11)
E::!.\: 0.3 18 5 1
:EV (A t) 10.4 7.6 4.8
The expected value decision for (11) chooses option A1 as
the alternative that provides the largest return.
Since all the events are the result of random
outcomes, expected value analysis requires the decision
maker to be able to withstand short term losses or instances
of less than ideal returns. The expected value approach may
not be appropriate for one-of-a-kind decisions or for
instances where exceptionally large or ruinous losses are
associated with small, but potentially significant
probabilities.
c. Expected Regret
1~e expected regret method applies the
probabilities associated with each outcome to a regret or
opportunity loss matrix similar to (6) above. Using (11)




E I P(E:L) Al A2 A~.:r.I
POSSIBL,E I.._......_..._.
OUTCOMES E1 0.2 5 7 0
E~;:~ 0.5 3 0 6 (12)
E3 0.3 0 13 17
: ER (A i) 2.5 5.3 8.1
Again, A1 is the best alternative as it causes the least
amount of opportunity loss. Maximizing EV(A:i.) will always
lead to the minimization of ER(A~). As noted with expected
value calculations~the decision maker will be subject to
the variance associated with each of the probabilities and
must be able to withstand short-term instances of contrary
results.
3. Summary
The basic classical statistical methods for
detel'mining rational decisions were presented. Strengths
and weaknesses of were noted. A limitation affecting all
of the methods was the failure to account for individual
preferen~es in regard to the magnitude of potential gains
and losses. Methods that seeks to overcome this obstacle,
while producing rational and consistent results for
individual decision makers, will be presented in the
following sections.
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C. UNCERTAINTY AND RISK
Uncertainty stems from the problem of dealing with
random events where the likelihood of an event's occurrence
is subject to some measure of variability. Humans have
exceptional difficulty dealing consistently with random
events. Coin tosses or other binomial events where an
objective and precise probability of occurrence can be
specified are conceptually easier to handle than events for
which no objective body of data exists from which to
genera.te a probabi 1i ty distribution. Kahneman and Tversky
[Ref. 26J have demonstrated that even individuals with
statistical training will often be subject to three
particular biases: representativeness, anchoring, and
availability. These biases are~ II highly economical and
usually effective, but they lead to systematic and
predictable errors. II [Ref. 26:p. 20J Since people have
difficulty dealing with random events, the concept of risk
is equally befuddling.
The risk of an event is the probability of occurrence
multipljed by cost. Risk is associated with notion of the
value that may be lost or unrealized as a result of a random
event. An additi6nalissue is the size of the variance
affecting the probabilities applied to the problem. Because
values are relative, how should a decision maker obtain a
defensible solution. to the problem of hazarding current
resources aga.inst the attainment of value at some future
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Itirne when the outcome is subject to randomness? Extensive
research has shown that individual concepts of risk change
dramatically as the potential payoff or loss becomes very
large even if the associated probabilities become relatively
small. The Allais Paradox~ presented below~ is an example
of this behavior.
Suppose a person is offered the following wager:
A: $1 Million guaranteed
versus
B: $5 Million with a 10 out of alOO chance
$1 Million with a 89 out of 100 chance
No money with a lout of a 100 chance
(13)
Allais~ Raiffa~ and Tversky have shown that the modal
response i:3 wager B [Refs. 17 ~ 26 ~ 27]. When the s i tuat ion
is altered so that there are large difference between payoff
values and small differences between probabilities people do
not follow the expected value model. Compare the following
wager to (13):
C: $5 Million with a 10 out of 100 chance
No money with a 90 out of 100 chance
versus (14)
D: $1 Million with a 11 out of 100 chance
-
No money with a 89 out of 100 chance
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The expected value model selects Cover D because of the
larger expected value:
EV(C) = $500K > EV(D) $110K
The modal response however is D. People begin to focus on
the small difference probability when the differences
between payoffs begin to get very large [Ref. 28].
Objective statements that are applicable to a broad range of
situations are exceptionally difficult to make. The
following sections will discuss some of the problems
associated with the measurement criteria that have been
suggested for decision analysis.
1. Historical Antecedents
Risk assessment is a very old practice. Records of
assessn)ent~ valuation, and accounting procedures, dating to
3200 B.C. have been found in the Tigris-Euphrates valley
[Ref. 29]. The "r isk accounting" procedure that was used
presages a modern proposal introduced to handle the risk and
uncertainty issues surrounding nuclear energy [Ref. 30].
The determination of risk and SUbsequent recommendation of
appropriate courses of action were placed in the hands of a
priestly caste who used a form of double-entry bookkeeping
to o.rrive at a quantified decision, carrying the weight of
assurance and confidence. Modern antecedents, employing
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concepts of mathematical probability and scientific analysis
of cause and effect~ effectively began with Laplace1s 1792
study of smallpox deaths.
Despite Laplace's ground-breaking effort" the
abilities of organizations to gather relevant data and
subsequently manipulate it in mathematically sound and
useful fashion remained haphazard. Although the concept of
insurance to spread the risk of commercial enterprises, as
well as compensate for the vagaries of human mortality are
ancient, consistent success in risk assessment and survival
of risk managing entities required the establishment of
professional actuaries. Covello and Mumpower cite findings
of the British Government in 1867 t.hat over 75 percent. of
1i fe insur'ance endeavors fai led -in the preceding 75 years
[Ref. 29]. More technically sophisticated methods for
analyzing the risk in commercial undertakings other than
life insurance or oceanic shipping required both more
rigorous codification of economic theory and more flexible
mathematical tools.
2. Modern Perspectives
All of the decision criteria examined so far either
ignore the existence of random behavior, or treat the
probabilistic likelihoods with certainty, failing to
consider the variable inherent in random events. As
discussed above" expected value or expected regret
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calculations fail to capture the potential impact of the
loss of value to the decision maker. The following example
highlights this problem.
Consider to wagers with identical probabilities
of occurrence:
Wager A: Receive $10 with probability of 0.5
Lose $10 with probability of 0.5
(15)
WagerB: Receive $10,000 with probability of 0.5
Lose $10,000 with probability of 0.5
Eva 1uated from an expected·· va lue perspect i ve, both wagers
are identical:
EV(A) EV(B) o.
However. if an individual participates in wager B, the
magnitude of the loss may be radically different from that
of wager A, depending on what proportion of net worth a
$10,000 loss represents. It is conceivable that an
individual could be induced to pay sum amount of money or
part wi th some quantity of val ue to "buyout II of wager Band
into wager A. How much money an individual would be willing
to give up and under what conditions forms the basic
approach to current risk analysis techniques. A significant
obstacle to this search is the variability of risk
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perception between decisionmakers~ as well as~ the
variability of risk perception by individuals in different
decision environments. Generically~ endeavors subject to
greater risk are understood to possess either greater
likelihood of potentially ruinous losses or instances where
the probability of occurrence may be quite small but the
associated event would be devastating. Crossing a busy
highway blindfolded would be an example of the former. while
an accident at a nuclear power facility or an aircraft
landing on a house would be examples of the latter [Ref.
31]. Risk analysis attempts to provide an additional
decision criterion that focuses on the potential variability
of an event~ asa complement to expected value analysis~
which ignores the variance issue. There are four major
approaches for tackling the risk problem:
a. Variance




i Jm .[y _ y ] 2. f Cy) dyavg i
-cD
This captures the notion that the greater the variance~ the
greater the potential risk. It does not address the problem
of potential skewness of the distribution governing yas
Figure 2-1 demonstrates.
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Series A -+- Series B
Figure 2-1 Distributions with S~eMeans and Variances
If the full probability density function is considered,
series A would be preferred and series B considered more
risky.
b. Semivariance
Semivariance attempts to concentrate on the
perceived risky portion of. the payoff distribution,









As with the variance method, distributions with equal mean
c"J.nd:3emi variance ,but di fferent risk potent ial ~ can be
constructed as shown in Figure 2-2. As with the ~xample of
variance.) .:\5 a measure of risk .. when the full probabi 1ity
density functions of series A and B are considered .. series B
would be the riskier of the two.








Series A -+- Series B
Figure 2-2 Distributions with Same Means and Semivariance
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c. Crit1cal Probability
The critical probability approach uses
thB ~d.me format as semivariance but substitutes a
probability value for a measure of variability.
P(y So c) -
jC
J -cD f i (y) dy
Bunn cites a definition generated by Fishburn that links the
two approaches.
Ria 1 =







(c - y) . f
j
(y) dy
When b == 2~ the semivariance method is used and when b == 0
critical probability is operable [Ref. 17:p. 35]. The idea
of a critical probability has certain intuitive appeal. The
critical probability can be viewed as a goal~ with reaching
or surpassing the critical value defined as success and
falling below the critical value defined as failure. This
highlights the personal and transitory nature of risk
evaluation [Ref. 26]. As with variance and semivariance~
counter-examples are easy to create~ as shown in Figure 2-3~
where both distributions have equal area below zero but
series B could be considered more risky.
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Series A :-+- Seria 8
Figure 2-3 Distributions with Same Means and Equal Area
Below Zero
d. Mean-Variance Dominance
This approach has its roots in financial
analysis. The premise is the same as discussed for the
nonstochastic dominance case. The outcomes of various
alternatives are characterized by their respective means and
variances. The decision rule is to choose those options
that possess the greatest mean and smallest variance. While
this may lead to an "e fficient lt set~ where dominance cannot
further winnow the choices, it may not identify a clear
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winner. Additionally~ it~ requires a more precise knowledge
of the process governing the outcomes than may be available
in some decision environments. Utility Theory offers a
potentially coherent avenue around some of these
I imi tat ions .
D. UTILITY THEORY
In 1944. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
pUblished their influential work, "Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior'l [Ref. 5]. Arising from a concept
originally put forward by one of the authors in 1928 .. the
principles developed in their work and embellished by
subsequent researchers form the basis for most current
techniques of risk assessment. Morgenstern and von Neumann
sou.ght to develop a complete set of rules that would define
I'rational behavior" and could consequently be used to guide
actions in any circumstance. They defined rationality as
optimal behavior in an economic sense; individuals would
consistently seek to improve their conditions. Optimal
behavior could be achieved through the use of " ... the
notion of mathematical expectation" [Ref. 5:p. 32].
1. Axiomatic Structure
von Neumann and Morgenstern define seven key
elements in this theory which provide a firm.. logical basis
of coherence. The theory is normative vice descriptive,
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desires.
A > B > C
This implies choice A is preferred to choice B and choice B
is preferred to choice C.
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c. Transitivity
The third point is transitivity. If the
decision maker were provided with the choices as pairs, say
A and B, or Band C, subject to the ordering
A > Band B > C, then it follows that A > C.
d. Indifference
Fourth is indifference. The composition of the
choices may be such that for some particular grouping, the
decision maker cannot categorically state a preference
bet.ween choices. 'Ibis indifference or substitutability
holds whether the various pairs of choices are considered
alone or whether they are grouped into a more complicated
option.
e. Reduction of Compound Prospects
Fifth, "Any compound prospect should be
indifferent to the equivalent simple prospect with
probabilities computed according to the usual rules of
probability. II [Ref. 17:p. 54] This provides a coherent
structure to the proposed solutions. Central to this notion
is the requirement that the decision maker has no preference
for the time-based portion of an uncertain prospect. This
rules out the consideration of preferences arising from the
joy of playing the game, the particular atmosphere
associated with a particular decision environment, or the
manner in which risks are presented.
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:f. Continuity
Sixth, utility values are continuous. This
involves the notion that for extremely noxious outcomes, a
non-zero probability exists that would lead the decision
maker to accept some other alternative which may be trivial
in some other circumstance. In the normal course of events,
an individual may be prefer a small sum of money toa zero
payoff, say $5. Then a non-zero probability exists, such
that, a prospect between $5 or death would be attractive.
While such an extreme seldom occurs, it is the sort of
prob I em tha t e>~p Ii. ci t 1Y confronts pub1i c po Ii cy bod i es when
ruling on issues that affect the welfare of society. This
axiom explicitly supports the construction Df autilfty
curve and allows for the more precise resolution of
utilities in regions of rapidly changing risk perception.
g. Monotonicity
Finally, preferences must be monotonic. This
implies that option A is preferred or indifferent to option
B, if and only if, the probability of A, PA, is greater than
or equal to the probability of B, PEt Monotonicity provides
a necessary and sufficient condition for the
preferred/indifferent ordering of various alternatives.
Thus, the utilities of different alternatives can be
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c~mpared through the use of expected utility. The expected




As with any theory .. there are specific limitations
that must be observed when applying the theory
to a particular decision problem~
a. Utilities Are Not Additive
In the event that the final payoff for some
prospect is the result of some sequence of alternatives .. the
utility of the final payoff is not equal to the sum of the
indiVidual payoff's utilities:
U(A + B) y:U(A) + U(B)
This is the result of the curvature of the utility function.
Specifically .. it recognizes the possible change in risk
perception governing alternative considerations .. as the
values of the payoffs change. The individual utilities are
additive~ only in the case of a risk-neutral decision maker
who effectively adopts an expected value criterion.
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b. Strength of Preferences Not Captured
The von Neumann/Morgenstern version of
utility theory creates an ordinal scale as opposed to an
interval scale. The numer:ical ranking is imposed only for
the purpose of sorting preferences. Consider the example of
team :r'dnkings in college football. A team could be rated
fifth one year and fourth the following year. This does not
imply that the same level of progress was made~ as a team
that was ranked second one year and then ranked number one
the next year [Ref. 32].
c. Not Comparable Between Decision Makers
The evaluation of risk as an integral part of
ut i 1 i ty. theory is very personal. Rapaport and Wallenstein
hdVC shown that, " ... the concept of risk is highly
idiosyncratic," and is a function of the risk-taking
situation or environment, personality characteristics of the
individual(s) involved, and their training and experience
lRef. 33J. This notion can be extended to social and
corporate organizations. as well. A dramatic example of
this feature of utility theory is MacArthurls decision to
proceed with an amphibious invasion at Inchon, despite
persistent and strident staff recormnendations to the
contrary [Ref. 34].
Determination of the relevant probabilities is a
key to this aspect of risk assessment. As noted above~
decision makers can be liable to the distortions caused by
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availability, representativeness, and imprecise notions of
causality IRef. 26J. Additionally, decision makers often
discount. assessed probabilities once a course of action is
decided upon, believing that they possess the ability to
control events [Ref. 35J.
3. Certainty Equivalents
While the axioms of Utility Theory provide a
template for determining whether or not an uncertain action
is coherent, some scheme is required to help the decision
maker order his preferences when faced with uncertain
prospects. The use of Certainty Equivalents was developed
for this purpose. If the payoff from a probabilistic
outcome can be compared in some fashion with a guaranteed
result, a quant.ifiable measurement of the individual's risk
perception will emerge.
Consider again the wager proposed in the discussion
of muder-Tl approaches to risk assessment:
Wager A: Receive $10 with probability of 0.5
Lose $10 with probability of 0.5
(15)
Wager B: Receive $10,000 with probability of 0~5
Lose $10,000 with probability of 0.5.
Depending upon the characteristics of the decision maker, he
may not be indifferent to these two wagers which would be
classified as equal under the expected value criterion. The
question then becomes, under what combination of
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probabilities and payoffs would he subsequently be
indifferent to A and B? von Neumann and Morgenstern
formalized the notion of certainty equivalents as a means of
addressing this issue [Ref. 5]. The method is intuitively
easier to grasp if the nature of the wagers is altered
somewhat.
a. Certainty Equivalent Assessment
Consider the following wager:
Wager A: $1000 with probability = 0.5
$0 with probability = 0.5
(16)
As the wager is presently constituted, the decision maker
might agree to participate as there is no potential loss and
it costs nothing to participate. Now suppose the wager is
amended as follows:
Wager A: $1000 with probability: 0.5
$0 with probability = 0.5
(17)
Wctger B: $300 with probability 0.5
$300 with probability 0.5
In this instance, the decision maker is required to choose
between the wagers, one affected by uncertainty, and another
one a guaranteed prospect. As presented, the decision maker
would choose alternative (A). Based upon an expected value
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EV (A) > EV (B)
By similar dominance reasoning, if the decision maker were
offered $600 not to participate in the wager, the individual
would take the $600. Therefore, there is some value between
zero and $600 which if offered to the decision maker as
certainty, would result in the decision maker being
indifferent to the choice of either A or B. Through an
iterative process it should be possible to determine the
decision maker's certainty equivalent for the wagers
presented in (17). For argument's sake, say this value is
$400. i.e;, if offered $400 to forego the wager between the
uncertain prospect and the guaranteed payoff, the decision
maker would accept the $400. This idea can be encoded into
a payoff matrix as follows:
At a monetary certainty level of $400, the decision maker
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would be indi fferent between A:l. .and A:;;.~. Addi tionallY ~ the
sensitivity of this Certainty Equivalent (CEl to small
perturbations could be uncovered. If the CE is changed to
say, $410, then the decision might be to choose A2.
Likewise, if the CE is reduced to $390, then A1 would be
chosen. A formal presentation of this hypothesis developed
by Bunn is:
Preference is indifferent between
X with probability p
or
Y with probability 1 - P
and Z for certain [Refs. 17:p. 41, 5:p. 24].
The advantage of this principle is that, in
theory. it. pr"ovides a means of uncovering coherent choices
in t.he presence of uncertainty. An additional benefit is
that values, other than money, can be used to achieve
coherent decision solutions. Payoff matrices more complex
than the simple binary example presented in (18) can be
evaluated with this approach and finer resolution of the
curvature of the utility function can be obtained by
successively examining segments of an initially binary
problem.
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b. Single Attribute Utility Functions
The standard approach is to scale the utility
values between zero and one, with the best case being
assigned a utility of one. The resultant CE can then be
used to further partition the utility scale for as many
points as desired, as demonstrated by the following utility
fu.nction constructed from wager (17) above. Matrix (19)
contains the payoff-utility values and Figure 2-4 displays
the results graphically.
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Figure 2-4 Single Attribute Utility Function
As can be see from the graph, intermediate utility
values can be obtained by interpolating between points. A
word of caution is necessary: if the decision maker feels
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that great importance can be attached to fitted utility
values in close proximity to each other~ then a detailed
sensitivity analysis may be required to obtain the
resolution necessary to support the decision. In such a
case~ the decision may not be solvable graphically [Ref. 17:
p. 63].
RP(x) EV(x) - CE(x)
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If the decision maker1s RP is greater than zero, he
is considered risk-averse, i.e., he would part with some
value equal to the RP in lieu of participating in the wager.
'If the RP is identically zero, he is risk-neutral. lithe
RP is less than zero, he is risk-seeking, i.e., he would be
willing to pay some amount equal to the RP in .order to
participate in the prospect. Figure 2-5 provid.es a
graphical presentation of these three cases.
RISK BEHAVIOR
















Seriea A -+- Series B .- Series C
Figure 2-5 Utility as a Function of Certainty Equivalent
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Series A, the convex curve, is a risk-averse
case. Series B. the straight line, is the risk-neutral
case. Series C. the concave curve, is the risk-seeking
case.
It has been noted by many researchers that risk
attitudes are not necessarily constant over the range of
possible payoffs or utilities [Refs. 36. 37, 38]. This
behavior WdS noted above in the Allais Paradox example.
While numerous analytic descriptions have been formulated to
describe individual risk-perception curves [Ref. 39]. a
graphical approach is useful for depicting a decision
maker's effective risk-perception attitudes. Once plotted.
the regions in the vicinity of inflection points can be more
clQselyresearched to provide feedback to the decision maker
about his perception of the problem under consideration.
5. Comments on Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
Whi Ie the von Neumann -- Morgenstern formulation is
sufficient to handle individual attributes of a problem~
many decisions involve a combination of attributes, some of
them potentially conflicting. The Multi-Attribute approach
developed by Raiffa and Keeney extends the coherence of
Utility Theory to a broader range of problems. While
conceptually simple in formulation, in practical terms it
requires extensive checks to ensure mutual preferential and
utility independence for all possible pair combinations. A
theorem provided by Keeney and Raiffa allows the set of all
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possible pairs involving 2" - 2 potential tests to be
reduced to n tests [Ref. 17]. As in the case of single
attribute utility functions. a value for the joint utility
function can be calculated for those instances where the
joint utility function can be decomposed into a linear or
mUltiplicative form. The multiplicative form is applicable
for those cases where a particular attribute must be
included in the solution [Ref. 17]. Weighting factors.
w-hose sum is one. are used ina manner analogous to
probabilities in the single attribute case to provide a
composite ut.ility value for some particular multi-attribute
solution set. The various solutions can then be compared
based upon a maximization rule.
Other approaches to the·multi-attribute problem have
been suggested. most notably Saaty's Analytical Hierarchy
Process (AHP) [Ref. 40]. While easier to implement in
practice than Multi-Attribute Utility, these techniques are
subject to criticism on a number of grounds. most notably
coherence [Ref. 41].
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the nature of the decision
problem and the requirements that must be met to guarantee a
rational or coherent solution. Various methods of
decomposing the problem into simpler elements under
stochastic and nonstochastic conditions were examined. The
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difficulties associated with capturing potential variability
in uncertain outcomes were presented. Utility Theory was
presented as a means of encoding an individual decision
maker's preferences and risk perceptions into a coherent
solution. The concept of Certainty Equivalents was
developed as a method for eliciting preferences and risk
perceptions consistent with the axioms of Utility Theory.
Some limitations of the theory were presented and the
general requirements for conducting analysis of multi-
attribute problems were defined. The existence of
alternative means of analyzing multi-attribute problems was
noted along with their potential problem of providing
coherent results.
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III. COMMERCIAL TECHNICAL RISK ASSESSMENT
A. BACKGROUND
The purpose of this chapter is to examine some aspects of
technical risk assessment as practiced by commercial
enterprises. The Defense Science Board concluded in its
1985 study of Department of Defense development programs
that the creation of the IBM 360 mainframe computer, the
Boeing 767 aircraft, the ATT telephone switch, and the
Hughes corrunercial communications satellite all compared, "in
complexity and size to a major weapon system development,
yet each took only about half as long to develop and cost
concomitantly less. 1I [Ref. 2:p. 49] There are two questions
to consider. Are the risk assessment techniques used by
cornrne:r'cial enterprises successful, i. e., do they provide
sufficient information for planning and system design?
Secondly, can risk assessment techniques used in commercial
operations be applied to Department of Defense acquisition
operations? The first question wi 11 considered in .. this
chapter. The applicability of commercial techniques to the
DoD environment will be discussed in Chapter IV.
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B. COMMERCIAL RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE
As discussed in Chapter II, the inception of modern risk
assessment and mathematical probability theory began with
Laplace1s study of smallpox mortality. It was only in the
mid-nineteenth century that commercial concerns developed
sufficient understanding of the required mathematical tools
to begin analyzing risk in a quantitative and rational
fashion. von Neumann and Morgenstern built upon the
economic equilibrium theory of the Lausanne School when
developing their Utility Theory model [Ref. 5:p. 15]. Since
the pubJication of their ground-breaking work in 1943, many
additions to inventory of risk assessment and decision tools
have been made. Farquhar listed twenty~eight different
techniques for tackling various aspects of the risk
assessment problem [Ref~39]. A natural expectation would
be that the commercial practice of risk assessment is well
developed and that some modicum of success is enjoyed in
accurately identifying risky projects. Upon a closer look,
it is apparent that this is not so.
C. RISK AND AMBIGUITY
Any commercial enterprise faces two key questions:
(1) What do consumers want? (2) Can the firm satisfy
particular consumer wants in a profitable manner?
Tremendous resources are expended in the attempt to define
consumer wants and preferences in everything from cars to
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political parties. However, as Kosnik observed, ambiguity
exists as to the extent of· consumer needs. This complicates
corporate efforts to satisfy these needs by matching
existing and emerging technologies with a constantly
changing marketplace. The marketing approach views the
business process as a , "highly integrated effort to
discover .. create, arouse. and satisfy customer needs
unfortunately customers cannot articulate what they need."
[Ref. 42:p. 121] This has led to some inconsistencies in
the application of classical Utility Theory as discussed
below.
1. Ambiguity Concerns
Classical Utility Theory is based upon knowledge
of the underlying probability distribution governing a
particular group of events. As discussed in Chapter II.
expected utilities can be calculated in these instances if
the magnitude of potential gains and losses is known. A
rjsk premium can be specified, based upon the risk-seeking
behavior of the firm. such that the firm would be
indifferent to the outcome of the event under consideration.
However. if there is ambiguity affecting the probabilities
governing the outcomes. empirical evidence suggests that the
associated risk premiums will be larger. Instances have
been noted where the resultant risk premium for small, but
ambiguous probability cases exceeded that applied to higher,
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non-ambiguous~ loss probabilities. In these cases~ firms
seem to rely upon the Il gu t feel ings " of the appropriate
decision maker~ than upon rigorous mathematical analysis
[Ref. 38 J •
2. Risk Perceptions
The size of the potential loss relative to the
value of the company is usually the key feature in the
practice of commercial risk assessment. This is countered
by classical economic theory. Higher performance levels~
i.e., greater profits. will accrue to firms that undertake
more risk [Ref. 36]. The application of probabilities to
estimates of potential gains and losses is the first step in
analyzing the risk associated with a commercial undertaking ..
Those prospects possessing the largest expected value would
be selected for exploitation. However~ in some instances~
firms may deliberately pursue prospects having a large
expected loss because of the potential "windfall " gain that
may accrue. In the long-run such actions would be ruinous.
The rationale behind this behavior is poorly understood. but
these actions can be seen by firms that are in extremis.
In such an instance, the survival of the enterprise, as
perceived by management, may be contingent upon the recovery
of a "windfall" profit [Ref. 43]. This seems to argue for
the application of Utility Theory to commercial decisions as
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..
opposed to the strict application of Expected Value. The
risk-seeking behavior of the firm apparently changes with
its overall fiscal health [Ref. 38].
3. Problems with Utility Theory
As stated above~ the Utility Theory approach
implies that the underlying probability distribution can be
discovered. This can occur through elicitation of
management's subjective probability estimates or through the
careful investigation of some physical process governing the
prospects in question. Does this~ in practice~ represent
what commercial enterprises are doing? March and Shapira
discovered that .. whi Ie possessing risk preferences ~
commercial managers act in a fashion different from the von
Neumann and Morgenstern model. ·Specifically~ managers were
willing to accept risks because they did not expect to bear
them [Ref. 38J.
a. Perceptions of Probability
Managers appear to be insensitive to
probability estimates of events. Managers focus on target
levels and make, ":i>harp distinctions between taking risks
and gambling." [Ref. 38:p. 140".*] As discussed in Chapter
II~ the notion of a Ilreference gamble" to elicit utility
values is central to the classical utility approach.
Winkler found that if the decision maker is an lIexpertll in
some field~ then success will be attributed to knOWledge,
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while failure will be the fault of chance. Conversely, if
the underlying process is poorly understood, then success
will attributed to chance [Ref. 44].
b. The Value of Knowledge
Given the above, the assumption could be made
that managers possessing expertise in a particular field
could sift through the relevant data describing some process
and arrive at a profitable decision. This is not always the
case. Capen, et al. conducted a study of the profitability
of petroleum companies when bidding for Government leases.
The problem studied by Capen, et al. was the poor success
rate and subsequently poor profitability of firms engaged in
Alaska oil field development. Both the Atlantic Richfield
Company and the Humble Oil Company had cooperated in the
investigation of the Alaska North Slope oil fields. The
l"olevant information about parcel petroleum characteristics
was pooled and known to both companies. However, during the
bidding process for subsequent field development, extremely
large bid variances for the same parcels existed. The
authors cited ratios of 100 for some parcels, with 5-10
being the most common. The authors concluded that the
winner of a particular parcel was the firm that, "most over-
estimates the true tract value. II [Ref. 45: p. 643]
Access to the same body of data and analysis by highly
skilled professionals did not guarantee success. The value
experts placed upon a particular tract was significantly
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different. Thus, recourse to expert knowledge in estimating
the probability of success in a venture does not guarantee
the expected pay-off.
D. TECHNICAL RISK ASSESSMENT ISSUES
The above quotation from the Defense Science Board (DSB)
implied that commercial firms may generally be successful in
their analysis of the technical risks affecting the
implementing of new ideas. While the projects cited by the
DSB were resounding successes for their manufacturers.
successes of this magnitude are not commonplace.
1. Accuracy of Assessment
The RAND Corporation conducted a study of
cl1emical pioneer process plants. The corporations bui Iding
the pioneer plants were all successful operations,
possessing large capital and information resources .. and
management structures attuned to the strategic challenges
facing their companies. The study concluded that
satisfactory performance required in excess of ten years
additional development work and that large cost overruns
where coronion. The study attributed this to the
establishment of fixed budget values prior to the completion
of a final design and incomplete understanding of the
challenges to be surmounted [Ref. 45].
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Similar findings were reported by Davis. Initial
construction cost estimates for new facilities were
typically less than balf the eventual amount. Davis
attributed this to under-estimating costs as opposed to true
cost overruns. Additionally~ eighty percent of new projects
failed to achieve their predicted market share [Ref. 47]. A
study by Battelle Memorial Laboratories discovered an
average of 19.2 years between invention and commercial
production [Ref. 48].
2. Technological Uncertainty
A slightly different conclusion was reached in a
recent survey of 108 San Francisco based companies spanning
service--based to high technology firms. The ability to
accurately ascertain the difficulties associated with new
ventures were more acute for organizations relying upon
advanced technologies, irrespective of company size. The
more advanced the technology providing the company's
profits. the greater the potentially negative consequences
of inadequate technical risk assessment. The higher the
level of technological advancement, the higher the level of
opportunity costs fora successful decision. Greater
technological complexity implies a greater degree of
uncertainty or ambiguity for the key decision maker
[Ref. 491.
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Ghemawat agrees with this conclusion. High
technology companies are faced with the dilemma of choosing
between a high-risk~ high-return prospect or, IIforegoing a
head start (and also experience related cost advantages) by
waiting until technological uncertainty is resolved. II
[Re f. 50: p. 148 )
3. Summary
Commercial operations have had minimal
success in solVing the probability estimation problems
cataloged in Chapter II. Corporations are· hampered by
judgement biases which result in schedule delays and cost
overruns. Issues of risk assessment and technological
uncertainty are as severe for firms marketing high
technology products as for DoD acquisition decision makers
attempting to maintain a technologically superior force.
Risk assessment methods that have proven to be successful
are not suitable for firms operating in very dynamic
ma.rkets.
E. EVALUATION TECHNIQUES
1. Discounted Cash Flows
The primary method for evaluating the potential of
any project is through the use of Discounted Cash Flows
(DCF). The basic premise is .. lI a dollar today is worth more
than a dollar tomorrow. II [Ref. 52) In theory~ the DCF
approach provides a rational and sound method for estimating
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the cash generated by a project during different time
periods. Projects competing for limited corporate dollars
can be readily compared with this technique. Additionally,
a firm can compare the projected cash flow of a project
against what the firm could earn by simply putting the money
in the bank or through the use of similar financial
instruments. The DCF method is not foolproof. It relies
upon accurate and unbiased estimation of three key factors:
Inflation, riskiness of the project over its projected life,
and risk reduction through diversification.
a. Inflation
Changes in the monetary inflation rate can
dramatically affect the profitability of a project. The
effects of inflation become more pronounced as the time
horizon of the projects expected life becomes longer. While
an accurate estimate of inflation rates is crucial, the firm
is Limited in its ability to control the effects on cash
flows. Uncertainty in this regard tends to push firms
toward projects having quick payoffs[Ref.51l .
b. Project Risk
The technical risks associated with any
project decrease over time. This is a natural result of·the
learning process. Maintenance of a fixed risk factor for
the life of the project tends to under-value the cash flows
that would occur as the project reached maturity. Older
technology does not necessarily imply useless technology.
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Large-scalepro5ects can continue to provide significant
cash flows long after the original payback has been
satisfied [Refs. 51. 52]. A further complication arises
from the methods used by firms to estimate the probabilities
of high risk events. Firms operating in established. slowly
growing markets have enjoyed success by employing these
techniques. However. "for fast moving and world-wide
industries. they have been a disaster. II [Ref. 53:p. 124)
c. Diversification
A key tool available to commercial operations
is diversification. While there are many diversification
techniques. the basic concept is that of portfolio
management. The corrunodity future markets are. in principle.,
an example of this. An individual takes actions such that
potential losses are balanced by gains .. so that the basic
financial position is protected. Futures contracts are
bought or sold to match. hedge. the individual's current
holdings and risk perceptions. The purchase of life and
property insurance policies are other examples.
Corporations can manage their various risk exposures through
the use of financial instruments or through investing
internally in a range of projects possessing varying degrees
of risk. The idea is to compensate for risk in a way that
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maintains the company's desired risk-seeking position.
Companies desiring a low risk position would not invest in
programs hav~ng potentially high risks [Refs. 51, 36].
2. Simulation Techniques
A modification of the basic DCF approach is to apply
a Monte Carlo simulation to the firmls estimation of its
business environment. Many software programs are available
that allow the user to specify the nature of the underlying
probability density function. A truncated log normal
distribution is typically applied to new projects. Its
shape matches the expected occurrence of budget overruns
versus underruns: Overruns at multiples of the original
estimate are far more likely than very large underruns [Ref.
52J. While this approach allows a firm to quickly examine a
multitude of scenarios with varying risk estimates, the
basic problem of determining the relevance of the
probabilities applied to the problem remains. The numbers
produced are subject to the biases and misunderstandings
examined in Chapter II. Strassman admits that the
probabilities of occurrence that he uses are based upon
personal experience and are not empirically defensible [Ref.
52]. The simulation approach simplifies the " number-
crunching ll aspect of analyzing a lot of prospects, but does
not necessarily deliver an unbiased result.
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a. Risk Adjueted Discounted Cash Flow
Strassman advocates the use of Risk Adjusted
Discounted Cash Flow (RADCF) analysis [Ref. 52] . This
approach splits the DCF into two segments: financial
and operational risk. Operational risk covers all risks
other than those associated with the cost of capital
[Ref. 52]. Low risk projects are those possessing at least
a 97.5 percent chance of providing profits over the life of
the project. High risk projects are those with less than or
equal to a 2.5 percent chance of providing profits over the
life of the project. Moderate risks fall between these two
extremes [Ref. 54:p. 19]. While providing better
quantitl:9.tive data for decision makers, this approach still
begs the question of how applicable probabilities should be
determined.
3. The Venture Capitalist Approach
The Venture Capitalist represents a different
entity than the standard commercial firm. While interested
in profits, he does not necessarily have to worry about
defending market share or finding new uses for his inventory
of technologies. The Venture Capitalist is generally free
to pick his area of exploitation and arranges the timing and
scope of his efforts ~ccordingly.
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a. Decis10nCriteria
A Venture Capitalist typically looks at three
items: business potential~ i.e.~ market~ pending solution of
technical problems~ expertise and commitment of the
development team, and lastly, financial requirements [Refs.
55, 56].
b. Number of Projects
A typical Venture Capitalist will look at two
to three hundred prospects a year. Perhaps ten percent of
these will be selected for further consideration. Actual
project commitments will be only two or three [Refs. 55,
56]. The average Venture Capitalist will be involved in a
total of five to seven projects at any time. The size of
the commitment is dependent upon the Venture Capitalist's
familiarity with the technologies in question and his
estimate of the technical expertise of the development team.
Financial arrangements often call for those whom the Venture
Capitalist is backing .. to invest a substantial portion of
their net worth :in the project [Refs. 55~ 56].
c. Expectations
The goal of the Venture Capitalist is to
quickly turn the project into a successful business venture
and then divest himself of the asset. Despite the careful
selection of projects and the relatively large commitment of
funds and personal effort .. on average .. the successful
Venture Capitalist can expect about twenty percent of his
68
projecLs to be complete failures and about twenty percent to
meet his profit goals. The remaining sixty percent will
fall in the middle, requiring additional time to reach
business goals and substantial divestiture effort [Refs. 55,
56J. These results seem to match those of the larger, more
conventional firms discussed above [Refs. 46. 48, 53].
F. SUMMARY
This chapter examined the ways in which commercial
ope:roations seek to assess their risk exposure. The use of
classical statistical tools and Utility Theory was
discussed. Some of the common evaluation techniques were
described, and their strengths and weaknesses noted. The
susceptibility of commercial operations to biases in
judgement, and over-estimation of the occurrence of
favorable events described in Chapter II, were highlighted.
While quantitative approaches to technical risk are
available, methods for probability estimation rely
exclusively upon individual judgement and assessment.
Standard probability estimation methods, e.g., reference
gambles or probability wheels, are spurned by corporate
decision makers. Risk compensation and diversification was
also discussed.
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IV. DoD ACQUISITION DECISION ENVIRONMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
The Department of Defense acquisition process is
exceedingly complex. Managers and decision-makers struggle
to achie~e the technical performance characteristics
required t.o support combatant forces within schedule and
cost constraints. They must deal with a host of agencies
and oversight bodies charged with monitoring all aspects of
cost~schedule~ and perforiliance progress. Acquisition
dccision-maY~ersmust be responsive to the directives and
requests for information from various service~ Department of
Defense l and Congressional entities that may have an
interest in some portion of the acquisition process. In
1985~ t.he Pentagon submitted almost 24,000 pages of
documentation to Congress, l'stemming from prior years I
defense authorization and appropriations bills and their
accompa.nying reports. II [Ref. 57:p. 76] Between 1970 and
1985, the number of congressionally mandated reports
increased 1000 percent [Ref. 57:p. 76].
The Department of Defense acquisition process
encompasses a multitude of functional disciplines other than
the contracting for a particular piece of hardware or
software. Careful consideration must be given to areas such
as maintenance and logistics support over the life of the
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system. The number of personnel qualifications and training
requ.irements for operators and maintenance personnel must be
taken into account. Basing requirements, support
facilities, and environmental impact of the new system or
its production process have to be planned. Unique test and
evaluation facilities may be required to ensure that an
accurate estimate of the system's real operational
performance is obtained. The interoperabilityof the
equipment with other services or U.S. allies must be weighed
during t.he definition, design, and testing of new
capabi I i ties.
An in-depth analysis of all aspects of the acquisition
process is outside the scope of this thesis. This chapter
will focus only on the assessment of technical risk and its
impact on the overall acquisition process as described in
DoD Instruction 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management
Pol icies and Procedures 'l . [Ref. 12) This document requires
that essential program elements
IlInclude clearly defined criteria for elements leading
to the risk assessment events. The satisfaction of
these criteria must be documented to support the rigor
necessary in the risk assessment process.' 1
(Ref. 12:p. 5-B-2)
The intent here is to provide abroad overView of the
decision criteria mandated by the "5000 11 series documents
[Refs. 12, 13, 14] and highlight the essential chronological
features facing the acquisition decision-maker.
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B. ACQUISITION PROCESS OVERVIEW
Office of Management and BUdget Circular A-109
[Ref. 58] " speci f ies requirements necessary for the conduct
of any federal acquisition. DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD
Instruction 5000.2 are the governing documents for DoD
acquisition decision-makers. They detail the procedures
that must be followed and the objectives that must be met
for a major new system start or an upgrade to a system's
existing capabilities.
1. Decision Makers
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition is
the Defen:3e Acquisition Executive (DAE). He is supported by
i
the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). The DAB is the top-
level review body for major weapons systems acquisition
decisions. The DAB is chaired by the DAE. Other members of
t.he Board include the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition; Service Acquisition Executives of the Military
Departments; Director of Defense Research and Engineering;
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and
Evaluation; the Comptroller of the Department of Defense;
and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. The
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as Board
Vice Chairman [Ref. 12:p. 13-A-2].
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a. Supporting Committees
The DAB is supported by three committees:
Strategic Systems (SSC); Conventional Systems (CSC); and C31
Systems (C3IC). The committees provide specific expertise
to support the acquisition review process (Ref. 59:p. 3].
b. DAB Responsibilities
1ne DAB convenes for each milestone review to
ensure compliance with previously specified performance
objectives. Additionally~ the DAB is to act as an
independent assessor of program health and future viability.
The DAB provides recommendations to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition on the various performance, cost.
and schedul e t.ri:1de-offs that may be proposed by the new
system's program manager. Consideration of relevant risk
areas, threat, technology, design and engineering, etc., is
an integral portion of this process during Milestone review
(Ref. 12: p. 13--A-2, Re f. 13: p. 4-E-l ] . Spec i fie i n format i on
on the mechanics of the decision process are provided in the
following section.
2. Decision Process
DoD uses a phased, systematic approach to analyze
the military requirements problem, develop satisfactory
solutions that meet performance goals, and manufacture and
support an operational system in a timely fashion at an
affordable cost. Five basic milestones are imposed on the
acqUisition process to ensure that these requirements are
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met. Milestones are paired with follow-on phases. The
phases are structured toward developing an operational
system while satisfying the interim goals set by the DAE and
the DAB. The goal is to develop an event-driven acquisition
strategy. tlthat links program decisions to demonstrated
accomplishments in development. testing. and production."
iRef. 59:p. 2J This structure is discussed below.
a. Mission Need Statement
The acquisition process begins with the
determination of the basic system performance requirements
neces;3alY to ei ther support new roi I itary obI igations, combat
emerging threat capabilities. or take advantage of new
technologies t.hat could substantially reduce. 'Iownership
costs or improve the effectiveness of existing materiel. II
[Ref. 12:p. 3-2] The procurement process for new capability
only begins after a determination that military requirements
cannot be met via changes to .. "doctrine. operational
concepts. tactics. training. or organization." [Ref. 12:
p. 3-2J These requirements are formulated in a "Mission
Need Statement II (MNS).
(1) Mission Need Validation. Mission needs
identified at lower echelons are validated by a designated
"operational ll authority: a Unified Command, e.g., Atlantic
Corrunand, a Specified Command. e.g .. Aerospace Defense
Command. the Military Departments, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. or the Joint Staff [Ref. 12:p. 3-2].
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If the validated requirement could potentially involve the
use of new t.echnologies or require a major upgrade to
existing perfnr-mance capabilities~ then the requirements
also must be validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Counci 1 (JHOC).
(2) Performance Requirements. The intent of the
MNS is to capture perceived operational requirements in a
broad fashion. The statement should be sufficiently
detailed to enable sUbsequent technical and engineering
studies~ but must avoid identifying a specific system
solution to the military reqUirements [Ref. 13:p. 2-1-1].
As an example~ a Mission Need could be generated for the
collection. evaluation~ and distribution of high quality
battlefield imagery. without specifying the use of a
partieD la.r technique. The MNS would speci fy the resolution
required~ size of imagery field of view provided to
combatant. forces, data transmission rate, cryptographic
requirements, etc. It would then become the responsibility
of the relevant DoD acquisition element to investigate and
develop feasible technical approaches that meet the military
requirements consistent with schedule and cost constraints.
DoD will often engage industry to supplement or fulfill
these requirements.
(3) Threat Assessment. DoD Manual 5000.2-M
specifically requires that the Mission Need Statement
identify the specific threat to be countered and provide a
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description of the likely threat environment [Ref. 13:
p. 2-1-1]. Thjs information is used at later milestones to
validate the sufficiency of proposed technical approaches
and help ensure consistency of evaluations.
(4) Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The
purpose of the MNS review by the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC), is to ensure development of
capabilities that may benefit more than one service or
enhance overall force qualities in a rational manner, while
accounting for the requirements of joint operations and
deployment. Validation of the reqUirements set forth in the
.M.NS i:3 ,~l so an integral part of this review.
b. Milestone 0: Concept Studies Approval
Upon validation of a legitimate military need,
the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) will direct the
init.iation of concepts studies. The purpose is to begin the
investigation and research process necessary to define the
specific Lechnical characteristics or "concepts" a new
system must possess to satisfy the MNS. The DAE will issue
an Acquisit.ion Decision Memorandum (ADM), specifying the
minimum number of possible ideas that should be investigated
and identifying the lead DoD agency r~sponsible for
conducting the necessary research [Ref. 59:p. 5]. At this
junct.ure, no definite date is established for the discovery
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cfa set of satisfactory solutions but a minimum set of
requirements will be established for progression to the next
milestone.
c. Phase 0: Concept Exploration and Definition
Successful completion of Milestone 0 marks the
formal beginning of the "Concept Exploration and Definition "
phase. The purpose o~ this phase is to identify a set of
possible technical solutions to the MNS requirements. The
accuracy of the threat environment posed by the original MNS
and the requirements for anew capability are also
investigated. Additional Phase 0 objectives are to meet
feasibility requirements specified by the DAEso that the
program may progress to Milestone I and to begin
the developrnent of an acquisition strategy [Re'f 12:
p. 3-8].
d. Milestone I: Concept Demonstration Approval
Successful completion of Milestone I marks the
official beginning of a new DoD acquisition program. The
purpose of this checkpoint is to ensure that the
requjr"ements specified at Milestone 0 have been met. The
most promising candidate solutions to the MNS are considered
along with their availability. The accuracy of the
projected thy"eat environment is val idated and the mi 1itary
requirements contained in the MNS examined. A complete set
of acquisition documentation must be submitted at this
review. including the Integrated Program Summary (IPS). The
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IPS contains seven annexes addressing all relevant portions
of the acquisition process. At this juncture, technical
risk is specifically considered in Annex D to the IPS
[ Re f 13 : p. 4--E--l] .
As mentioned in the previous section, the
program manager is required to categorize the risks of
threat, technology, design and engineering, etc. A ranking
scale of low, medium, or high is used. Numerical data is
not l'--equired. No guidance is provided as to what
constitutes admission into one of the categories. The
techni ca 1 appt'oac'h chosen wi 11 determine the magni tude of
potentjal gains or losses and the likelihood of their
occurrence.
The ADM issued at completion of. Milestone I will
specify a concept baseline containing initial cost,
schedule. and performance objectives. Exit criteria will be
specifjed. These will form an interim set of goals to be
achieved during Phase I.
e. Phase I: Demonstration and Validation
The purpose of Phase I is to improve the design
characteristics and better define the expected capabilities
of the system. Efforts are made to improve the design
teamls understanding of the technical processes involved in
the selected approach(s). ReqUirements necessary for the
successful completion of the Milestone II review are
pursued. A Development baseline for the most promising
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alternative is created during this phase. High risk areas
and their potential compensators are to be identified as
well [Ref. 12:p.3-14l
f. Milestone II: Development Approval
The key aspect of this milestone is to determine
whether the results of the Demonstration and Validation
phase SUppOl"t continuation of the program. Specific areas
of concern at this juncture are the validity of the
potential threat assessment and countering Mission Need and
whether 01'-' not the proposed technical so 1utions are
understo('\\,1 and dctually employable. Technical risk. problems
can significantly delay passage of this milestone, resulting
in potenLia.. l t.rade--offs between original performance, cost,
and/or schedule goals. An update IPS with revised risk.
assessment information, Annex D, is provided. Resource
allocation in terms of personnel and money are reviewed.
Succos~ful passage of this checkpoint results in a further
refinement of base-line cost, schedule, and performance
goals. The ADM will address specific criteria that must be
met for passage of Milestone III~ Production Approval and




g. Phase II: Engineering and Manufacturing
Development
During this phase the most promising technical
approacn wi 11 be converted into a, listable, producible .. and
cost effective system design. II [Ref 12:p. 3-21] The
manu[dcturing process will be validated and contract
compliance will be determined through system testing. The
operational suitability of the system will be determined
and a production baseline will be formulated. [Ref. 12:p.
3-21J
h. Milestone III: Production Approval
As with previous decision points, the purpose of
this checkpoint is to verify that the exit criteria
specified by the Milestone II ADM have been met. The
results of engineering and manufacturing evaluations"must
support a conclusion that the new system design can be
efficiently produced. is Dperationally acceptable and
logistically supportable. By this time, most technical risk
factors should have been eliminated. The status of
program risk issues will be contained in the IPS. The cost,
schedule, and performance characteristics of the new system
will be defined by how well risk was identified and
countered. Successful completion of a Milestone III review
leads to the authorization for full-scale production of the
new system. The resultant ADM will specify any program-
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specific exit criteria that must be accomplished during
Phase Ill, including refined program cost, schedule~ and
performance objectives. [Ref. 12:p. 3-24J
i. Phase III: Production and Deployment
The goal of Phase III is to field an operational
capabtlity that meets the MNS. This is achieved by a
stable design and efficient production and support
pr<lf.::e:.::;ses. The system performance is moni tored to ensure
compliance with MNS requirements and maintain system
capability against projected threats. [Ref. 12:p.3-27]
j. Milestone IV: Major Modification
Approval
As required .. the key objective here is to
determine whether upgrades to existing systems are required,'
prudent. and cost-effective in light of projected threat
cdpabi 1 i ties or erner'gent mi 1 i ta.ry requirements. Technical
risk issues re-enter at this point. The technical approach
selected for a potential upgrade will affect not only the
performance of the upgrade but also the underlying
capabilities of the host platform. The resultant ADM will
specify at what phase of the acquisition process the
proposed modification will enter and approve the modified
acquisition strategy and baseline.
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[Ref. 12:p. 3-29]
C. RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES
The assessment and monitoring of technical risk by DoD
acquisition authorities is a continuous requirement
[Ref. 12:p. 6-A-3]. Senior Department of Defense managers
recogni zed in tl1e early 1980s that broad reforms were
required in the total acquisition mechanism. As a result,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci issued thirty, two
initiatives in 1981~ The initiatives were aimed at
improving nlanagement control and the efficiency of the
acquisition process [Ref. 57:p. 47]. Initiative 11 was
directed at jmproving the manner in which quantitative
program risk was identified and its magnitude estimated
by Progr<:iffi Managers [Ref. 8: p. 33J. As a resul t, DoD
In:3truction 4245. 7-M. "Transition from Development to
Production." was issued.
1. DoD Instruction 4245.7-M
A rev'iew, conducted by the Defense Science
Board, on acquisition program Viability was conducted and
they concluded that there is, " no structural mechanism that
can articulate with any degree of certainty the risk
associated with the engineering and manufacturing €lements
of the weapon system acquisition process. II [Ref. 14:p. 1-3]
Inadequate understanding of technical risk factors was
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determined to be a major source of risk in itself [Ref. 14:
p.9--B]. Curorently, DODT5000.2 PART 5, Section B addresses
Risk Management and specifically calls out Program Manager
use of DoD 4245.7-M to identify areas of program risk.
DoD Instruction 4245.7-M segregates the
acquisition process into a rational grouping of industrial
design problems covering design, testing, production,
facilities, logistics, and management [Ref. 14:p.1-8J.
Technical risk is explicitly identified and a template was
created to aid program managers and senior decision makers
in making better use of the technical risk information
available to them [Ref. 14:p. 9-8].
1ne instruction does not specifically address
techniques for estimating the likelihood of adverse
consequences, nor give guidance on how decision"makers
should rank the riskiness of various alternatives. What is
provided however, is an outline for program management.
This outline calls for the development ofa system that
provides early identification of technical risk factors,
instantaneous assessment of program status, and early
indications of potential success or failure. Guidance on
the development of such a risk assessment and monitoring
system is absent. Program Managers are apparently left to
their own initiative [Ref. 14:p. 9-9].
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2. The Legacy of Carlucci Initiative 11
The commitment of senior DoD acquisition
officials to the Carlucci Initiatives did not filter down.
A st.udy conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in
1986 concluded that DoD had, "no t carried through with its
action plans on most of the Carlucci initiatives. II [Ref. 57:
p. 48J An additional GAO study of technical risk assessment
concluded. "The net effect of Initiative 11 on technical
risk assessment procedures has thus far been negligible. 1I
[Ref. 8:p. 33]
a. GAO Findings
The GAO study cited above surveyed
;:5 major progt'am offices from all three services.
Standardization of assessment techniques was completely
lacking. Additionally, there was limited direction from the
appropriate service acquisition authorities concerning how
risks should be ranked. Subsequent GAO investigations of
major programs has revealed no change in DoD technical risk
assessment practice (Refs.9~ 10. 11]. Both DoD Instruction
5000.2 and DoD Manual 5000.2-M (Refs. 12. 13] are devoid of
the explicit guidance recommended by the GAO in 1986 [Ref.
8: p. 77] .
b. Risk Compensation
Compounding DoD technical risk problems
is the apparent practice of examining the technical risk of
various prog:r'ams as· discrete events. Whi Ie some commercial
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compensation options are unavailable to DoD management,
e.g., hedging or other financial strategies, there i8no
direct mechanism for combining risk information into a
departrnent..c-wide risk profile. Risk compensation and
reduction is tackled at the program level by individual
program managers. The absence of a standardized technical
rjsk quantification scheme hampers senior management's
attempts to establish and manage a departmental risk
portfolio. La.eking quantifiable and comparable technical
risk data and common baseline, technology trade-off
decisions are difficult [Ref 8:p. 51].
3. Corporate Information Management
Initiative (elM Initiative)
Paul Strassman, Director of Defense
Infol"~mat.ion,. is attempting to implement elM within the DoD.
elM is bu.ilt upon a "business easel' approach to analyze the,
llpotential CO:5ts-sdving Alternatives for DoD information
management. fl [Ref. 54:p. 1] A key feature of the elM
initiativA is the use of the quantitative risk assessment
techniques he developed in his book, The Business Value of
£9mputel~S;__. ~D-Ex~cutive's Guide [Ref. 52J. Strassman's
goal is to conduct a Risk Adjusted Cash Flow analysis of new
irlformation technology acquisitions using Monte Carlo
simulations. The Institute for Defense Analysis created a
spreadsheet software package that will run a user-specified
number of trials with user-entered probability values. The
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output of the package is a series of graphs and tables
depicting the relative costs and benefits accruing from
different information technology alternatives. An Expected
Value comparison is the decision criterion. While the
program accepts user-defined probability values for the
likelihood of achieving various outcomes. individual
judgement is relied upon for probability generation [Ref.
54:pp. 19-23].
D. SUMMARY
This chapter highlighted the key features of the
major weapon systems acquisition process. Basic decision
criteria and considerations were presented. The functions
of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and the primary
decision authorities were listed. The importance of"
technical risk assessment to the acquisition process was
presented. The origin of current directives addressing
technical risk assessment in the 1981 Carlucci Initiatives
was noted. The continuing absence of formal and explicit
guidance on methods to be used to assess and rank the
technical risk associated with new system acquisitions was
a 1so d i ::3cussed.
The consideration of technical risk on a project-by-
project basis without specific guidance for quantifying
technical risk robs senior decision makers of valuable
information necessary to manage a Department of Defense~wide
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technical risk portfolio. Without quantifiable
technical risk data~ the overall impact of the risk
associated with the technologies DoD is developing is
uncertain. Categorization of risks as low, medium, or high
is left to individual program managers and no baseline for
comparison exists. As Paul Strassman has observed, liTo
understand your risks, you need to knowhow much money you
could 10se." (Ref. 52:p. 217]
While certain risk compensation strategies employed by
commercial operations are unavailable to DoD~ e.g. " hedging
dnd alternative financial markets, a portfolio approach
based upon quantifiable and comparable risk data is still
applicable. It allows for a more rational and systematic
improvement of any desired DoD technical risk profile. The
overall Department of Defense technical risk position needs
to be examined and explicitly managed to provide an overall




Although the axioms of Utility Theory are logically
consistent and lead to coherent solutions in principle,
significant problems remain with the elicitation of spec-ific
utility values [Refs. 17 .. 26, 27]. As discussed in Chapter
III, the approaches used by commercial ventures, many
decision makers are reluctant to use the recommended
techniques of standard devices of 50:50 reference gambles.
probability \-{heels or urns full of different colored balls.
The most strident reclama in DoDls response to the GAO
report on the Navy's T-45 program was reserved for use of
the phrase IIcalculated gamble l! by the report I s authors
[Ref. 9J. Probability assessment approaches are fraught
with considerable peril and often reqUire significant
assistance from analysts who are outside of the decision
making organization. Significant time and resources may
have to be committed to familiarize a decision analysis team
with the nature of the problem. Several iterations
involving coherence and sensitivity checks may be required
to ensure a satisfactory result. Finally, the results of
the analysis may reqUire considerable distillation and
explanation. Previous systems hailed as possible solutions
to various risk problems have frequently drawn criticism
88
from program managers because of these factors [Ref. 60].
The expertise often resides outside the program office,
requiring the program manager to rely upon systems he may
not fully understand and personnel who are not directly
accountable to him.
1. Limitations of Expert Opinion
An intuitive approach to the solution of any
complex problem is the elicitation of engineering or
scientific expert opinion. While a group of experts can
provide valuable insights into likely solution methods and
their individual opinions codified into a consensus, their
estimation of the associated probabilities of success or
failure may be tremendously ambiguous and overconfident
[Ref. 26]. In a 1980 study conducted for the U.S.
Department of Energy, Salem et al. [Ref. 31] cite an
instance where expert opinion was elicited to determine the
likelihood of a catastrophic seismic event involving several
different nuclear reactor installations. The seven experts
polled were from the fields of civil engineering, geology,
and geophysics.
There (sic) opinions as to the probabilities of large
earthquakes varied by as much as four orders of
magnitude (i.e.~ a factor of 10,000) in more than one
instance. Equally as interesting is the fact that
several of the seven participants estimated their
uncertainties at less than a single order of
magnitude (two estimated their general uncertainties
as a factor of two or less). [Ref.31:p.34l
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In an article on competitive bidding strategies
for the purchase of government-owned oil reserves, it was
noted that even though two companies had worked closely
together on the surveying and evaluating of potential
:t'ese:r-ve size and had completely shared all the resul ting
data, the subsequent bids submitted for individual parcels
where dramatically different [Ref. 45].
2. Utility Assessment Issues
Assuming the decision maker is willing to
investigate a utility function approach to his problem, then
lits decision problem can be reduced to a number of smaller
sub-problems. This approach is favored by various
engjneertng disciplines and matches the DoD Work Break-Down
Structure required during program review. As discussed in
Chapter II, the value of utility function analysis lies in
its ability to incorporate preferences and risk perceptions
in a coherent fashion.
While risk-neutral behavior is often suggested for
governmental operations, implying strict adherence to
Expected Value maximization, individual decision makers and
dtBtjnct governmental entities, i.e., DoD, Department of
Energy, Food and Drug Administration,. etc.,. may be extremely
risk dV(jl.··~;e [Refs. 17,. 31] because of the immense
consequences of particular decisions. Obtaining reliable
Expected Values requires the use of probability
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The values of G and L are not constrained to be greater than
zero. If any three of the four variables~ X~ G~ L~ and p~
are fixed .. then the fourth can be determined. The decision
maker must establish the effective end points of the
problem, the maximum assigned a utility value of one and the
minimum a value of zero. The assessment process then seeks
to uncover the value/utility pairs for the defined interval.
There are four basic methods for eliciting therequlsite
information: Certainty Equivalence .. Probability Equivalence ..
Gain Equivalence .. and Loss Equivalence '[Ref. 17].
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a. Certainty Equivalence
Recall from Chapter II that a Certainty
Equivalent (eE) is a guaranteed payoff used to determine the
valuA~3 of gain, loss, and associated pr:obability of an
opposing prospect. Gain, loss, and/or probability are
ddjusted by the decision maker so that he is indifferent
between the value of a certain payoff and the expected value
of a prospect operating under conditions of uncertainty.
In this approach, G, L, and p are fixed
and the d~cision maker is requested to provide an X, the
value of the guaranteed payoff. Bunn states that this
H\f): 11()(1 !,t:fld:, to emphasize more risk averse behavior relative
tu potential gains and more risk-seeking behavior relative
to potentidl losses [Ref. 17]. Goodwin and Wright point out
that t.he manner in which- the elicitation question is phrased
subslantiallyimpacts the nature of the r~sponse[Ref. 27].
Goodwin and Wright use the following example of certainty
equivalent elicitation to underscore this point:
Insurance Formulation
A: You have one chance out of 1,000 of losing $1,000
B: You can buy insurance for $10 to protect against this
loss.
Gamble Formulation
A: You stand one chance out of 1,000 of losing $1000
B: You will lose $10 with certainty
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It was di.scovered that 81 percent of the subjects preferred
option B in the Insurance formulation as opposed to 56
p(jYcent who preferred B when the prospects where framed in
terms of a gamble [Ref. 27:p. 81].
A further consideration with certainty
equivalence occurs if the operable probability distribution
is skewed. If the decision problem involves only very high
or very low probabilities .. the 50:50 construct should be
avoided.
b. Probability Equivalence
In similar fashion, probability
equivalence fixes the values of X~ G.. and Land requires the
decision Ulctkel' , to assess p. Whi Ie this tends to provide an "
average risk attitude .. it is subject to the kinds of
limitations discussed previously about human probability
assessment capabilities .. particularly when dealing with very
',j; \I,~ry :-irnal.l probability values or when attempting to
elicit responses for small changes in likelihood .. e.g ...
moving fJ "i)ffi 0.90 to 0.95 [Re f. 27]. Despi te this.. Certainty
and Probability equivalence are the two more popular
tHc:hniques.
c. Gain Equivalence
In the Gain Equivalence method, value
for certainty, loss .. and probability of gain are fixed and
the decision maker is required to assess an appropriate gain
value. An issue with this approach, as with Loss
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Equivalence, is the affect of anchoring bias as described by
Kahneman f:tnd Tversky [Ref. 26]. The manner of incrementing
the Gain value, as well as the determination of the initial
value~ c;an dffect the response.
d. Loss Equivalence
Loss Equivalence follows the above
procedure with the certainty equivalent, gain, and
probabili.ly values now fixed and the corresponding potential
loss value assessed by the decision maker.
e. Summary
As developed in Chapter II,
th<:'~(Jr·eL.i.ca.lly, the uti 1ity function approach allows the
decision maker to bring his perceptions and judgements about
the potential risk of an endeavor explicitly into a problem
solution in a coherent manner. The four techniques
d is(~ussed above provide methods for accompl ishing this in a
generic way but the limitations of each must be recognized.
As point(~d. out in Chapter II, the development of utility
theory arose through the consideration of monetary results.
Much subsequent research has been spent on various means of
equating monetary and non-monetary values [Refs. 17:pp.
102-107, 31]. The acquisition decision maker faces a
similar problem. How should technology be "valued" and what
constitutes "technical risk?" These questions will be
considered in the next two sections.
94
B. TECHNICALRISK
As was pointed out in Chapter I~ the force employment
strategies favored by the United States rely upon the
fielding and maintaining a technologically superior
military. Many resources are expended in monitoring the
technological capabilities of potential adversaries. As DoD
approaches the problem of maintaining a qualitative
technical edge, an element of uncertainty is introduced.
Solutjons to force capability problems will be selected that
ideally will provide the requisite technical performance.
Hlhi;'V(''H'', th(; 1'eS11 1t.ant system may not possess the necessary
performance when finally fielded. Any technical performance
11"~'3S tl)HO thc'! speci.fied value may result in a system that
once fielded, is unable to meet "force employment needs in
all intend~3d thodters of action. Alternatively~ the system
may not possess the effective lifetime originally intended
lH~:cause of fai lure to achieve the specified technical
performance.
1. Technical Risk Factors
Technical risk is affected by two related
factors: realized technological value of the proposed system
Vel'gu~3 i nLc~nded performance and obso lescence.
a. Realized Technical Value
Despite the best of intentions~ a
particular level of performance may not be achieved~given
the Chdl"d<:ter'istics of the technical approa.ch followed.
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Tb.Js can occur because the overall level of technical
capability was insufficient to reach the goal or because
otller pr()gram. constraints forced a reduction in the
resources available for goal attainment. As a result~ the
fielded system~ even if developed within the specified time
period may fall below its performance goals. The risk in
this instance is whether the nearest competitor system can
exceed the performance of the fielded system. While this
aspect of technical risk may be mitigated by pursuit of
parallel approaches .. at some point the acquisition decision
maker will have to commit himself to one system to meet·
force requirements.
b. Obsolescence
The time required to move a system from
the d(~s ign l)hdse to laC wi 11 ul timate ly affect its useful
life. Systems are designed to provide a specific amount
perfOl:'lnanCe over a designated period. The primary
consideration being some amount of qualitative edge~ i.e.~
lH:~t! {·~r t:llctIl t1le UC\dcesl competitor by some specified amount.
Useful system life hinges upon what else is occurring in
t'oldted technological development efforts while pursuing a
particular approach: What is happening to the state-of-the-
art? If the project takes longer than anticipated to bring
to IOC~ and even if technical performance goals are met~ the
useful life of the system may be significantly shortened.
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2. Technology Valuation
Technology has no intrinsic value. Its worth,
1. U<e money, :i8 only in the services it provides. Any
attempt to measure a technological value must resort to
COrnpdl"dt i ve techniques. Automobiles are valued more highly
than a horse and carriage, by some, because of. the
flexibility in transportation and perceived ease of
ownership. Likewise, many people prefer mass transit
~3ystems to automobi les. The value of the automobile is
relative to the perceptions and environment of the
individual conducting the valuation.
Similarly, military systems are valuable only
in relatjon to potentially competitive military systems.
The muzzle-loading rifle may have some value to antique gun
collectors but its value as a present-day weapon is nil. It
is non-competitive with its host of potential competitors.
GIvon a mi~:.;sjon or goal, it should be possible to state,
whether a particular system is capable of functioning in a
mantHH" sufficient to lead to the accomplishment of a mission
or attainment of a goal. This implies the use of judgement
by the individual or group responsible for the mission or
goal to determine the capabilities of the technology in
question.
The problem then becomes of one of
quantjfication versus qualification. If scarce resources
are to be expended to obtain the services of a particular
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piece of technology, it would be worthwhile to be able to
state how much better one proposed technological
implementation is than another. The quantification process
forces the careful consideration of potential alternatives,
counter~poisedwith the likely environments, in which the
candidate technologies may be required to operate and the
potential missions requiring support. The valuation method
adopted here is the TASCFORMT,vI mode l, deve loped by The
Analytic Sciences Corporation for the Director~ Net
Assessment. Office of the Secretary of Defense. which will
be explained in the following section.
C. TECHNOLOGY VALUATION MODEL
1. The Technology Valuation Model
The TASCFORM"TIVI mode 1, Technique for ASsessing
~omparative force Modernization. is means of indexing the
technical performance characteristics of fielded military
systemsfRef. 61). It provides a non-dimensional number or
figure of merit int.endedto capture the multiple attributes
associated with various weapons platforms. This approach
prOVides a decision maker with an ordinal scale which can be
used to compare and rank the technological value of
different systems. Additionally, it allows the decision
maker to observe how much more technical performance one
system may have when c.ompared wi th another. TASCFORM™ uses
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an additive and multiplicative multi-attribute approach with
"operationally-oriented" subjective weighting factors to
handle the magnitude and importance of various attributes.
The TASCFORW·· ....' approach incorporates a variety
of ~3o 1ienl Clldl'"acte:r'istics such as payload, range, speed,
mobility, navigation and target acquisition measures
lRef. 61]. The basic form of the additive model is:
wlv:·r-o J i:3 LL,..' ()\/t:~ra 11 platform index, k:l. , . , kn are
thn Bu1Jj{~(,:1 ively dusig'ned weights and V:I.,. , V,") are the
technology values of the respective attributes.
The multiplicative form is:
This approach is used when some Vi, a particular
technological variable, must be included in the system.
Possible examples of this requirement would be a
survivability, range, or payload value.
2. TASCFORW"M Appl ication
While TASCFORMTM indices have been developed for
a wide range of forces, for the purposes of this thesis, the
values developed for tactical and ASW aircraft were used.
The baseline [or the indices is the technology incorporated
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in the F-4B, a circa 1959 aircraft. Composite technology
values representing the synthesis of basic airframe
performance (speed, maneuverabi 1 i ty " range .. and payload) and
imbedded weapon system capabilities (target acquisition,
navigation .. counter-measure susceptibility, etc.) were used,
ht~~Call~3e this represents a technology index relevant to
mission employment.
3. Limitations
The i ndi ces produced by the TASCFORMT'Y' mode I are
not, in themselves, predictors of the potential combat
success or failure of the platforms under consideration.
While not scenario specific, the weighting factors
incorporated in the sample reflect operational criteria
relevant to a U.S.~Soviet engagement in Central Europe.
Application of the indices to other theaters involving
SO"viet or other nationality weapons would necessitate
readjustment of the values. The indices obtained are
independent of the likelihood of occurrence of a particular
scenario. Thus .. while the probability of a conflict between
U.S. forces and those of the erstwhile Soviet Union may now
be very small, such a scenario represents an extremely
challenging technical environment. Cost data are not
incorporated in the model .. which facilitates a direct
approach to the assessment of technical risk unmodified by
other considerations [Ref. 61].
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D. PROPOSED TECHNICAL RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD
Any method for assessing technical risk that seeks to
provide coherent solutions must be sensitive to both the
axiomatic requirements of Utility Theory and the practical
issues of implementation. Two critical obstacles to the
effecti.ve application of Utility Theory have been the issue
of probabtlity assessment and the use of reference gambles.
The Ilstandard device" procedure is subject to trivialization
on the part of the decision maker. The following proposed
~
method for assessing technical risk~ attempts to circumvent
these problem~3 through the provision of an explicit
probability distribution and a valuation system that keeps
thc~ technology utility function assessment process confined
to issues of technical value.
1. Assumptions
Following the work of Moses~ Dodson, and Knight
[Refs. 62, 63, 64)~ the following assumptions were made:
a. Technological value can be quantified
b. The growth of U.S. military
te:chIlological value over time can be modeled using linear
regression techniques.
c. A probability distribution can be
derived from the resulting regression equation that will
allow an acquisition decision maker to determine his
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likelihood of obtaining a system possessing some specified
Lechnellogical performance value based upon the resul ts of
p:r"evious technological development.
d. The performance value of the closest
likely competitor technology can be estimated using the
TASCFORM'r,'v. method [Ref. 61].
e. Using the Certainty Equivalent technique
descr'ibed abuve, the acquisition decision maker can quantify
~is technological risk perceptions directly and incorporate
these into a utility curve that would assist him in
determining a satisfactory approach to meeting the mission
needs of milit.ary forces while incorporating a notion of
t.echnica,l risk.
2: System Technology Sample
Fo 1] ow'i ng the work of Moses [Ref. 62], the
statistical model used a sample of 49 U.S. Navy and Air
Fol"'cO aircraft deve loped between 1950 and 1979. The sample
was restricted to tactical and anti-submarine fixed wing
platforms for which TASCFORM'1" l"1 performance index values
where available. Source data for year of laC and composite
technology values were obtained from the U.S. Military
Aircraft Cost Handbook [Ref. 65] which contained TASCFORMTM
composite technical values for the aircraft in the sample.
The technology values contained in the Handbook were derived
using the TASCFORM"''''' methodology discussed above and derived
[Ref. 61). The Aircraft System Performance (ASP) values
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"vvo'X'e used. The ASP value adjusts basic airframe measures of
payload, range, speed, etc., for mission requirements of
!Cl.t\p:::t dc·qu):=3it.ion, navigation, survivability, etc. and thus
more tr'uly !'eflect. platform capabilities [Ref. 61]. The
I C:,-3U 1tdllt vc11 u.e~:) aretabul ated in Tabl e5-1 by a it'frame




































































































































The regression model was hypothesized to be
11Il!:~dl of the form:
FLYTECH CONSTANT + A * YEAR + e~
where "FLYTECH II is the TASCFORM-""'''1-derived composi te ASP
technology value, "YEAR" the year of platform IOC~ "All a
regression coefficient I and lie" any residual error not
explained by the model. The regression was run using the
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Student Version of MINITAB~ Version 1.1. Regression
coefficients are provided below. Regression results are
presented in Table 5-2~
FLYTECH -32.493 +0.73724 * YEAR
REGRESSION RESULTS
TABLE 5-2




























The regression coefficients vary slightly from those Moses
(1)ld j!H~d [Ret. 62J because of the inclusion of P-3C Orion
and S-3A Viking platforms.
4. Regression Goodness of Fit
The proposed regression model adequately
d.:~:~r:riJ;;~~5 the: aircl"aft technology data. The model is
significant at the p ~ 0.000 level. Five different plots of
the resultant regTe::3sion data were constructed .. as
recommended by Devore [Ref. 25:pp. 498-503], to assist in
Lhl;;.~ dlld lysi~j of Lhe regression IS " goodness-of-fi t. II Figure
5-1 displays a plot of the regression line and the actual
technology values over time. Figures 5-2 and 5-3 are plots
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of the ~,i_':l.Ilij,=trdizcd le~~iduals. An analysis of the data
contained in these figures shows that the distribution of
the residuals appears to be random and most of the points
fall with plus/minus two standard deviations of the expected
residual value of zero. Figure 5-4 displays actual versus
estimated technology values. The graph corroborates the R~~
value that time in the form of year of IOC is a reasonab"le
explanatory variable for technical value. Figure 5-5, a
normal probability plot of the standardized residuals, shows
that the residuals follow a straight line and are contained
within the interval (-2, 2). This tends to confirm the
assumption that the error t.erm is normally distributed.
Figure 5--4 i:3 a plot of estimated versus actua ltechnol ogy
values. Figure 5-5 is a normal probability plot of the
sLandardized residuals. A listing of fitted values,
residuals, standardized residuals and normal probability
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Figure 5-5 Plot of Normal Probability VB Standard
Residuals
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Following a method suggested by Montgomery
[Ref. 66J, a check was made of the standardized residuals to
determine if there is a significant difference in the
behavior of the positive residuals as compared to the
negative residuals. An F-test with 19 and 30 degrees of
freedom was constructed as follows: The the sum of the
variances for the 19 positive residuals was divided by the
sum of the 30 negative residual values. The null hypothesis
was that this ratio should be equal to one:
He> : 2.~::..Li±.L
s:;'~ ( i -)
1 where s~2(i+) are positive residuals
and s2(i-) are negative residuals
Hl: .__E~~:Jj +) .. ~ 1= 1
s:;;:~ ( i-- )
The results are provided in Table 5-3.





F = 1.43354 p = 0.184
The test result indicates that the sums of the
respectjve variances are the same at the p = 0.184 level.
The differences in the sums of the respective variances be
partially explained by the large effect of the F-14A and
F-111F technology indices. These values in particular are
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greater than two standard deviations away from the expected
technology value for the year of IOC.
5. Technical Advance
Obtaining the services of a technology that
performs better than the state of the art is an essential
driver in the DoD acquisition process. Not only does this
pl"ov:ic1H rt putentially large quantitative edge over 1 ikely
competitor systems at the time of 10C. it also tends to
1 (;;.~1l9lhuI1 the usc 1 i fe of the system. in the presence of
steadily progressing technological performance.
An estimate of technology performance value
different from the state of the art. for a given year. can
be obtained by taking the difference between the actual and
estimated technology values:
ADVANCE FLYTECH - SOA,
where II FLYTECH II i s the TASCFORMTM c omposi tetechno logy index
dnd "SOAl' is the ~3tate-of-the-art technology index based
upon year of IOC estimated by the regression equation. A
posiLi"v'e AdvcUlce Value indicates a system that possessed
better' than state of the art technology, while a negative
value indicates a system that was below the SOA at time of
IOC. The more positive the Advance Value, the greater the
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:.system's qualitative edge over systems that are
state-of-the-art. Table c5-4 provides a listing of Advance
Values by aircraft designator.
































































































































































TECHNOLOGY VALUES: MEASURED VERSUS ESTIMATED
TABLE 5-4
AIRCRAFT roc TASCFORM CALCULATED
YEAR COMPOSITE INDEX
(1950··... 79 ) INDEX
A-7E 68 19.77 17.62
A-7D 68 16.17 17.62
F-111D 68 24.39 17.62
S-3A 69 20.21 18.35
F-111F 70 31.01 19.09
A-4M 70 8.52 19.09
A-6E 70 22.40 19.09
F-14A 71 31.51 19.83
F-15A 73 16.14 21.30
A-lOA 75 12.12 22.78
F-16A 78 15.69 24.99














The Advance Value is calculated to provide a comparative
technology value in determining the technology utility
function. It is not the absolute measure of the index that
is importdIlt" but rather the comparative difference between
alternatives and likely competitors as viewed over time that
providc~s d. mor'e rneaningful measure of a system's technical
advan~ages. An example of the value of a relatively large
Advance Value can be seen in the TASCFORM-I"'I'1F-14A
performance value compared with IlS0A" at time of IOC.
The 11.68 1971 IOC Advance Value is greater than
t'wo :-:d":';l-ndfiY"tJ dev.id.l.ion~3 above the regression estimate. The
state-of-the-art did not achieve this value until
approximately 1987. The attainment of this Advance Value
provided for exceptional platform longevity. On the other
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hand, theA-6E was characterized by an Advance Value of only
3.31 at the 1971 IOC, necessitating efforts in the early
1980s to obtain a successor system.
E. TECHNICAL RISK AND UTILITY DETERMINATION
The Advance Value information generated by the
regi'c:3sion equation can now be combined with the Certainty
Equivalent utility assessment technique, described above, to
create a utility function that incorporates the decision
maker's risk perception. The necessary steps are presented
below.
1. Functional Limits
Functional limits define the interval on which
the utility function will operate. These are necessarily
judgemental, but can be specified. The functional limits
durine the;:. space in which the design engineers will work to
create a system that meets military mission needs. The
maximum value is scaled as a utility value of one and the
minimum acceptable value is assigned a utility value of
2. UtilityElicitation
TIle pr()posed method uses the certa i nty
equivalence technique, posed in the form of an lIinsurancell
premium, and nests the responses working inward from the
functional limits. Initial minimum and maximum values are
determined from the DoD Mission Needs statement as discussed
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..
in Chapter TV. This document reflects the requirements of
Unified and Specified Commanders. Military Departments, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. or the Joint Staff to
meet national military objectives and or counter current
thr'ea,t cilpabi 1itj es [Ref. 12]. These values reflect the
desired and minimum performance requirements any candidate
system must possess tomcat the requirements of the entities
listed above. Subsequent interval endpoints are obtained
dUY'j,ng the ut.ility elicitation process.
a. Certainty Equivalence
A certainty equivalence form. with
probability equal to 0.5. is appropriate in this case. The
sample Advance Value distribution appears to have a
symmetric. normal shape [Refs. r7. 27]. This approach also
abides by the requirement that the certainty equivalent. Z.
lie within the interval X < Z < Y. where X is the functional
minimum and Y the functional maximum for the interval under
consideration.
b. Functional Limit Determination
Based upon the analysis of mission needs
and estimated performance of likely competitor systems. the
initial minimum acceptable Advance Value for the projected
year of roc can be specified from the TASCFORMTM process and
the SOA regression calculations. The functional maximum can
be similarly determined from the regression results using
either a plus three standard deviation value from the
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regression estimated SOA or some increment to immediate
predecessor technology performance. Subsequent sub-
intervals will result from the iterative utility assignment
process.
3. Example
Figure 5-6 shows a representative plot of
u.s., series A, and Soviet tactical air, series B,
performance indices derived from the TASCFORM™ method as a
function of time. As can be seen, U.S. platforms enjoyed
an average advantage of about four index units when compared
with competitor Soviet platforms. Soviet technical
capabilities are used for comparison purposes as these
represent systems widely used throughout the world and pose
a significant military challenge to U.S. forces even if not
actually employed by Soviet forces.
AVERAGE PERFORMANCE INDEX
FIXED WING TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
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Figure ~-6 U.S. and Soviet Technology Indices
Over Time
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•The following is an example of how the proposed
utility assessmAnt proceSS-WOUld work. The utilities
c\~;::51gned to t.he various technology performance val ues are
those of this researcher.
a. Functional Limit Determination
Suppose the overall force structure
requires that any new air combat system possesses a minimum
technical performance value of at least 2.5 index units
above an anticipated Soviet competitor at time of IOC. The
.tesultant performance index specifies the utility minimum
and is assigned a value of zero. For this example, the
minimum Advance Value will be specified as -4. The initial
functional Advance Value maximum will be specified at 16.
T1 '1 ; 'oj d 1 ! j ;, '" a. :-j::"; i gn ed aut iIi t Y va 1u e 0 f 0 n e .
b. Certainty EqUivalence Assessment
The initial prospect is framed in the
following manner:
A. Obtain a platform with an Advance Value of 16 with
probability of 0.50
B. Obtain a platform with Advance Value of -4 with
probability of 0.50
The expected value of this prospect has an Advance Value of
6.
C. Specify the Advanc~ value you would accept to protect
against obtaining a system with an Advance Value
of -4 .
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The answer to C provides the Advance Value corresponding to
a utility value of 0.5. The two new sub-intervals,
te, 16) dnd (-4, C)~ are SUbsequently decomposed into their
respective utility values by means of the nesting technique
discussed previously. EX<1IDples of possible results are
presented in Table 5-5 and Figure 5-7.









































The utility curve in Figure 5-7 displays
risk'--:.3cektng behavior on the interval (-4, 4), risk averse
behavior over the interval (4, 10), and risk-seeking on the
interval (10, 16). The results are consistent, in general,
with the axioms of Utility Theory, as there is no
requil"ement to di.splay a constant risk behavior. The
combination of risk behaviors over the sub-interval
preclud();3 l'ecourse to Mean - Variance analysis. The next
step in the analysis would be to closely examine the
results, pal'-t.icuJ~rly in the region of inflection points, to
ensure that they truly reflect the decision makerls
4. Utility Function Application
Once the function has been determined and the
decision maker is confident that it captures his
preforences, probabilities determined from the regression
can applied. The resultant Expected Utility can then be
used to :3elect candidate system technologies for goal
accomplishment. Each candidate would possess some Advance
Value whose likelihood of success can be ascertained by the
use of the normal probability distribution associated with
the SOA regression. Given a particular Advance Value, the
probability of achieving that value or greater can be
directly calculated. This probability, when multiplied by
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the corresponding utility value, gives an Expected Utility
value (EU), which can be subsequently ranked against other
candj.dat es .
F. UTILITY FUNCTION ALTERNATIVE
Although the Utility Function approach presented above
will capture the individual decision makerls risk
rH~rceptions.. it does require careful iteration. Individual
sensitivities in regions of curvature changes must be
tbt)roughl:l exarnined. An additional consideration is the
organizat.ional environment in which the acquisition decision
L"3 H1dde. An alterndtive approach is to empLoy the Extended
PectrsQll-Tuk(;:y (EP-T) method.
1. The Extended Pearson-Tukey (EP-T) Method
The EP-T method, as described by Goodwin and
vIr iyllt, [Rp t. 27] ha.s been found useful in a variety of
continuous distribution cases. It breaks the ranking scale
into three segments .. high, medium .. and low. The three
categories requiring decision maker estimation correspond
to:
a. Value which has a 95% chance of being
exceeded (Low). This value is assigned a probability of
0.185.
b. Value which has a 50% chance of being
•
exceeded (Medium). This is assigned a probability of 0.63.
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•c. Value which has only a 5% chance of
being exceeded (High). This is assigned a probability of
0.185.
The prohntl) 1 i ties ref lect the symmetrical nature of the
implied distribution and sum to one. The specific values in-
this case can be obtained by analyzing the regression
results in terms of the normal distribution of Advance
Values.
a. Example
Using the results of the regression
analysis* a possible risk-assessment approach using the EP-T
method would be conducted as follows: Since the residuals
appear to belong to a normal distribution~ z-values for the
respective 0.95, 0.5, and 0.05 technology values can be
obtained from a standard normal table. The standard
deviation value of 5.288, obtained from the regression, is
then u::::ed to arrive at specific technology values. The
results are summarized in Table 5-6.
EP-T METHOD EXAMPLE
TABLE 5-6
% Chance of Exceeding z-value Advance Value Risk
95 -1.645 -8.6 Low
50 0 0 Medium
05 1.645 8.6 High
A~ Cdn be seen from Table 5-4, 30 of the 49 aircraft in the
sample would be considered low risk, 15 would rank as
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medium risk .. and four would be high risk cases. Expected
Value (EV) methods, discussed in Chapter II, are then
applied to select the candidate systems which provide the
highest EV. This may provide a faster solution to the
problem. The disadvantage lies within the probabilities
dssigrled to the three levels. As pointed out in the
discussion of Utility Theory, risk perception is
inLrinsically personal. While organizationally, critical
probability levels can be assigned by fiat, these may tend




This chapter began by highlighting some of the concerns
dod p:r'oblc~m:3 ,~u:H3()ciated with obtaining the probability
values necessary for the Utility Assessment .approach.
R{-;,C'ou:r~:)e 10 t:;{perL opinion was shown to be inadequate for
this task. The four basic methods of Utility Assessment,
Pl"(JbdJJl11Ly f~lluivalence, Gain Equivalence, Loss Equivalence,
and Certainty Equivalence, were discussed and their
re~3pective sLr'ength::> and weaknesses noted. Two major
factors affecting technical risk, realized technical value
and obsolescence, were explained. A means of measuring
technology on an ordinal scale was introduced. The




discussed as a means of measuring technology for subsequent
utility assessment dete~mination. A regression model of
technology over time was constructed using TASCFORMTM values
f01:' a sample of 49 U.S. Navy and Air Force aircraft spanning
the period 1950-1979. The purpose of this model was
twofold: To obtain a probability distribution that
characterized the attainment of technology values unaffected
lJy the individual biases described by Tverskyand Kahnemann,
and to obtain a measure of technological advantage, an
i'Ac']'./linct=: Value ll , tl-li~t could be used to construct an utility
function for varying technology values. AnUtility
A~,3:3i::3:sment lec"hnique, using Certainty Equivalence, was
proposed and an example of a possible risk-assessment
scenario was put. forward. The notion of Expected Utility
using the probabilities determined from the regression model
was discussed. An alternative means of risk assessment, the
Extended Pearson-Tukey method, was dis~ussed. and the
excunple l"eworked using this approach. Problems associated
with both methods were discussed .
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. Technology can be valued and measured using an
ordinal scale,
The technological characteristics of a weapon system
can be assigned numerical values in a coherent fashion.
These values can be subsequently used to order alternative
systems from most capable to least capable. The numerical
differences between alternatives can provide an indication
of how much better one alternative is than another.
2, The increase in technological state-of-the-art over
time can be explained by a linear regression as a first
approx i mat ion",
As organizations become more familiar with
technological requirements and capabilities. the
technological value of new systems increases over time.
This value can be split into state-of-the-art and
technological advance components. The projected
state-o£-the-art can be estimated via a linear regression.
Technological advance represents capability over and above
the state-of-the-art a.t the time the system is fielded.
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3. The probability of achieving a particular level of
technological value can be estimated.
The probability distribution characterizing the
regression residuals can be used to estimate the likelihood
of achieving a particular technological value at a specific
moment in time. This removes a serious problem in risk
assessment: estimating the probability of obtaining a
certain level of technical performance. Expert judgement
can be focused on determining the technical requirements of
a system and valUing the technology inherent ina new
weapons system.
4. UtiLity functions for technology can be created.
A utility function for technology values
characterizing a range of system alternatives can be
created, representing the risk preference behavior of an
individual. The utility function can be found using the
Certainty Equivalent method for technology valuation systems
possessing symmetrically distributed residuals.
5. The Extended Pearson-Tukey (EP~T) method can be
applied to determine the risk inherent in a range of
alternatives.
The EP-T method can be applied to technology
valuation systems possessing symmetrically distributed
residuals. This approach, while less sensitive to
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individual risk preferences, is much faster and lends itself
to conventional Expected Value comparisons between competing
options.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Department of Defense should continue exploring
the ut i 1 i ty of TASCFORW"IV!-l ike technology valuation methods
for technical risk assessment.
This would focus expert knowledge on areas of value,
which would be more amenable to expert judgement. and avoid
estimating probabilities by human judgement. Probabilities
can be analytically determined for those cases where a
linear regression approximates the growth of technological
value over time.
2. DoD should investigate the application of the
Extended Pearson-Tukey (EP-T) method for characterizing
technical risk via a pilot program approach.
While the generation of individual technology
utility functjons can represent an individual's risk
perception and risk seeking behavior, a Utility Theory
approach may be too cumbersome to employ in a complex
organization. The EP-T method is simpler and faster to use.
It lends itself to those applications where the probability
distribution governing some process is symmetrical. It has
the added advantage of supporting traditional Expected Value
analyses.
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c. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Investigate the potential dichotomies between the
Program Manager's (PM) perception of technical risk and
those of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB).
As documented in this thesis, risk perception is a
specifically individual characteristic. The technical risk
inherent in a new system acquisition project may be
perceived differently by the DAB. the PM. and various
supporting staffs.
2. Investigate ordinal technology valuation schemes
applicable for all military systems.
A family of technology valuation schemes using
ordinal scales would allow for ~xplicit quantitative
comparison. Such a device would allow senior management to
conduct technologically based comparisons between U.S. i:1.nd
potentially hostile forces.
I
3. Investigate methods of conducting Department of
Defense-wide risk portfolio management.
Methods for pooling individual quantitative project
technical risk assessment information into a central
portfolio should be explored. Techniques for managing the
overall DoD technical risk position should be investigated.
This could provide senior decision makers with a more useful
129
risk indicator of DoD's exposure to technical risk. It
would also provide quantitative data on which to base




AIRCRAFT IOC YEAR TASCFORM CALCULATED
COMPOSITE STATE-OF-THE
INDEX ART
F-89C 50 2.46 4.35
F-9F/H 51 4.19 5.09
F-89A 51 4.05 5.09
F-84F 51 5.13 5.09
F-86F 51 4.03 5.09
F-86D 51 3.68 5.09
F-2C 51 3.91 5.09
F-3A/B/C 52 9.02 5.82
F-1B/C/M 52 5.29 5.82
F-86H 52 5.68 5.82
F-100A/C 52 4.80 5.82
F-11A 53 5.80 6.56
A-3A/B 53 10.74 6.56
F-l02A 53 9.71 6.56
F-6J\. 53 7.58 6.56
A-4A/B 5':l 3.93 6.56. .:;
F-1E 54 5.44 7.30
F-l01A/B 54 13.55 7.30
F-100D 54 5.99 7.30
F-8A/B/C 55 8.40 8.03
A-1J 55 3.34 8.03
F-9F 55 4.02 8.03
A-1E/G/H 56 3.34 8.77
F-104A/B 56 6.79 8.77
F-106J1./B 57 13.05 9.51
F--105B/D 57 14.86 9.51
A-4C 57 5.45 9.51
F-4A/B 59 9.32 10.98
A-6A 61 13.83 12.46
A-4E/F 61 7.27 12.46
F-4C/D 6'-' 10.07 13.19L.
P-3C 65 30.33 15.41
A-7A/B 65 12.10 15.41
F-l11A 65 18.46 15.41
F-4E 66 13.96 16.14
F-111B 66 24.81 16.14
F-4J 66 13.39 16.14
A-7E 68 19.77 17.62
A-7D 68 16.17 17.62
F-111D 68 24.39 17.62
S-3A 69 20.21 18.35
F-l11F 70 31.01 19.09
A-·4M 70 8.52 19.09












F-14A 71 31.51 19.83
F-15A 73 16.14 21.30
A-lOA 75 12.12 22.78
F-16A 78 15.69 24.99




AIRCRAFT IOC YEAR ADVANCE STANDARD NORMAL
RESIDUALS PROBABILITY
VALUES
F-89C 50 -1.89 -0.91478 -1.10394
F-9F/H 51 -0.90 -1.05636 -1.45013
F-89A 51 -1.04 0.80981 1.01428
1t F-84F 51 0.04 -0.78958 .....1.01428
F-86F 51 -1.06 -2.08095 -1.84145
F-86D 51 -1.41 -0.51618 -0.65252
F-2C 51 -1.18 -1.00697 -1.20356
F-3A/B/C 52 3.20 0.26118 0.47355
F--1B/C/M 52 -0.53 0.64542 0.85598
F-86H 52 -0.14 -0.28700 -0.30897
F-I00A/C 52 -1.02 0.41603 0.59076
F-I1A 53 -0.76 -0.64585 -0.85598
A-3A/B 53 4.18 -2.14163 -2.23702
F-l02A 53 3.15 -0.10807 0.15261
F--6A 53 1.02 -0.36498 -0.41745
A-4A/B 53 -2.63 -0.23414 -0.15264
F-1E 54 -1.86 0.61989 0.78453
F-101A/B 54 6.25 -0.42871 -0.59076
F-,-lOOD 54 -1.31 -0.53953 -0.71693
F-8A/B/C 55 0.37 -0.32561 -0.36267
A-1J c:;t=: -4.69 -0.60852 -0.78453....J....J
F-9F 55 -4.01 0.19452 0.41745
A-IE/G/H 56 -5.43 0.06684 0.36267
F-104A/B 56 -1.98 -0.78286 -0.93217
F·-I06A/B 57 3.54 -0.17934 0.05069
F-105B/D 57 5.35 -0.15207 0.10151
A·.,-4C 57 -4.06 2.29787 1.61546
F-4A/B 59 -1.66 -1.03021 -1.31686
A-6A 61 1.37 -1.90119 -1.61546
A--4E/F 61 -5.19 -0.06761 0.20411
F-4C/D 62 -3.12 0.00460 0.30897
P-3C 65 14.93 -0.27914 -0.25618
A-7A/B 65 -3.31 -0.21065 -0.10151
F-111A 65 -3.06 -0.03196 0.25618
F-4E 66 -2.18 -0.37473 -0.47355
F-111B 66 8.67 -0.20674 -0.05069
F-4J 66 -2.75 -0.25810 -0.20411
A-7E 68 2.15 -0.20370 0-.00000
A-7D 68 -1.45 1.17210 1.20356
F-I11D 68 6.77 0.60925 0.71693
S-3A 69 1.86 -0.38799 -0.53122
F-111F 70 11.92 1.03150 1.10394
A-4M 70 -10.57 0.68122 0.93217
A..... 6E 70 3.31 0.58843 0.65252










F-15A 73 -5.16 1.31825
A-lOA 75 -10.66 2.33663
F-16A 78 -9.30 2.89203
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